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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court improperly granted p;n <iul si
Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure claim?

n:u v judgment on

Standard of Review. A district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the district court. Swan Creek
Vill. Homeowners Ass 'n v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122, 1126 (Utah 2006). When
reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we view the facts and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion. Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650, 651
(Utah 1990).
Issue Preserved at: Plaintiffs Memorandum in Oppositions to Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 957), Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiff s Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Fraudulent Nondisclosure.
(R. 1620) and Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider
Ruling on Fraudulent nondisclosure. (R. 1701).
2.

Whether the trial court improperly granted partial summary judgment on
Plaintiff s Breach of Contract claim?
Standard of Review: The same standard of review applies here as above.

Issue Preserved at: Plaintiffs Memorandum in Oppositions to Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 957) and Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims (R. 1519).
Whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs
Negligent Misrepresentation claim?
Standard of Review: The same standard of review applies here as above.
Issue Preserved at: Plaintiffs' Objection and Reply Memorandum in Support of
Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (R. 123, 132), Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Ruling on
Negligent Misrepresentation (R. 1629) and Reply Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Negligent Misrepresentation (R. 1697).
Whether the trial court erred in failing to award Plaintiff compensation for her
experts' time in preparation for depositions noticed up by the Defendants?
Standard of Review: The legal conclusions of the trial court are accorded no
deference, but are reviewed instead for correctness. Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr.
Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991).
Issue Preserved at: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion to Award
Expert Witness Fees, Tender into Court, and Conditional Request for Oral Hearing
(R. 1027) and Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion to Award
Expert Witness Fees, Tender into Court, and Conditional Request for Oral Hearing
(R. 1178).
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Plaintiff was entitled to her
attorney fees for only her breach of contract cause of action?

2

Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a
question of law5 which we review for correctness. Chase v. Scott, 38 P.3d 1001,
1003 (Utah App. 2001).
Issue Preserved at: Plaintiffs Verified memorandum of Costs, Disbursements and
Attorney Fees in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for an Order Awarding Attorney
Fee's Expenses and Costs (R. 2148), Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s
Motion for an Order Awarding Attorney Fees, Expenses and Costs (R. 2276) and
(R. Hearing On Motions June 6, 2005 pg. 0044-0072).
Whether the trial court's finding of fact support its reduction in attorney's fees
and costs?
Standard of Review: A determination of the trial court's findings of fact in support
of an award of attorney's fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, granting
considerable deference to the trial court. Wiley v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah
1997).
Issue Preserved at: Same locations as issue number 5.
Whether the trial court erred in applying ILR.C.P. Rule 54(d) standards to the
meaning of "costs" pursuant to the contract?
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of the meaning of "costs" in
the contract is a question of law. Thus, the trial court's legal conclusions regarding
the contract are accorded no deference and are reviewed for correctness. Chase v.
Scott, 38 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Utah App. 2001).
Issue Preserved at: Same locations as issue number 5 and 6.

3

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5. See Addendum No. 17 of Defendants' Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Moores (Plaintiff) filed suit against the Smiths (Defendants) on August 24, 2000
pertaining to the Smiths' faulty construction of a home (42 Uniform Building Code and
related Code violations) and then sale of the home to the Moores under theories relevant
to this appeal of Breach of Contract, Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent
Nondisclosure. (R. 01). The following year Mr. Moore, who had been in ill health,
passed away. (R. 146).
Over the course of the five year litigation extensive discovery ensued with both
sides retaining experts. (R. 156-786). Defendants filed six (6) Motions for Summary
Judgment which ultimately resulted in the trial court dismissing some of Mrs. Moore's
causes of action and eliminating 37 defects which she could present to the jury. (R. 28,
917, 1351, 1358, 1367 and 1377). Mrs. Moore filed two motions requesting the trial
court to reconsider its Order dismissing Plaintiffs Negligent Misrepresentation cause of
action and its Order eliminating her 37 defects. (R. 1618, 1627). While the trial court
did so reconsider, it refused to alter its prior rulings. (R. 1747). Prior to trial, Mrs.
Moore decided to not pursue three (3) of the remaining five (5) defects submitting to the
jury the defects of frost line depth and faulty insulation of windows. (R. 1953).
At trial Defendants argued that they disclosed the footings defect to William
Moore, Mrs. Moore's deceased husband. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0445-0449).
4

Dan Smith testified that he informed Mr. Moore of the lack of dirt around the footings
and the Mr. Moore agreed to take care of the finished grading to remedy the defect. (R.
2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0445-0449, 0479-0482). However, Mrs. Moore testified
that she was within an arms length of her husband during both of their trips to the home
and that this conversation never took place between her deceased husband and Dan
Smith. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0538-0539). She testified that no defects were
ever disclosed to them and that there was no agreement to fix the footing defect. (R.
2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0103, 0538-0539). The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Mrs. Moore ruling that Dan Smith did not disclose the footing defect to the Moores and
assessing damages at $30,680.00 on the Breach of Contract and Fraudulent Nondisclosure of the frost line depth defect. (R. 2112). Defendants filed three post-trial
motions all of which were denied. (R. 2116, 2139, 2194). Later, in response to Mrs.
Moore's motion for attorney fees, costs and expenses, Judge Eyre awarded her
$40,000.00 for reasonable attorney's fees incurred and $10,000 for costs and expenses.
(R. 2400). Mrs. Moore's total claim was $123,639.64 in reasonable attorney's fees and
$35,288.08 in costs and expenses. (R. 2308).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In 1993 Defendant Dan Smith was a Utah licensed general contractor and master
electrician who had built and, along with his wife co-defendant Carol Smith, sold over
200 homes in the state of Utah. (R. 806-807, 964). In August of 1993, the Smiths begin
building another home in Fillmore, Utah and three months later moved into it while still
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finishing up the construction. (R. 1269). They did not obtain a Certificate of Occupancy
until January 28, 1994. (R. 1269).
A couple of weeks later the Plaintiffs William and Mary Moore, middle-aged first
time home buyers who had no knowledge of construction or real estate transactions, were
told by a mutual acquaintance that the Smiths, who the Moores knew, were selling the
home they had just built. (R. 069, 966, 2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0087). On
February 11, 1994, the Moores contacted the Smiths and while meeting with them were
told by Mr. Smith that he was a builder and that he knew what people liked and this was a
beautiful home. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0090, 0178). Later that same day the
Moores walked through the home discovering no defects. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript
pg. 0088-0090).
Four days later, on February 15, 1994, Smiths and Moores signed a standard
Earnest Money Sales Agreement [hereinafter "EMSA"] for the purchase price of
$83,000.00. {See Defendants Brief Addendum No. 7). While the Smiths filled out the
EMSA and were reviewing the "as is" language contained therein with the Moores, the
Moores asked, "Is there anything we should know about?" Dan Smith replied, "It's a
new house". (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0103). The Smiths never disclosed to the
Moores any defects or building code violations. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0103,
0538-0539). In light of the newness of the home and Mr. Smith being an experienced
contractor the Moores felt no need to have a professional home inspection performed.
(R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0199, 0591-0592).

6

The Smiths moved out of the home the following month with the closing
occurring on May 2, 1994, Moores paying cash for the home which was the accumulation
of nearly their life savings. (R. 809, 2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0086). The Moores
moved into the home immediately thereafter. (R. Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0049).
In April of 2000, the Moores were informed by a contractor, who was digging
post-holes to erect a fence and gate on the property, that the footings on which the homes
foundation rested were not buried to the required depth. (R. Jury Trial Transcript pg.
0120-121). He further informed them that this could cause substantial structural damage
to the home and that an inspection should be done. (R. 070). Shortly thereafter, the
Moores had a professional building inspector inspect the home which lead to the
discovery of forty-two Uniform Building Code violations or defects that would require
$111,000.00 to repair. (R. 070-071, 810-812).
SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT
Defendants have raised several issues on appeal relating to the applicable statute
of limitations, the discovery rule, the trial court's Special Verdict and Plaintiffs
fraudulent nondisclosure claim. However, the Defendants have failed to preserve two of
these issues for appeal and did not marshal the evidence on two other issues. Therefore,
Defendants should be precluded from bringing those issues on appeal. Lastly, even if
these issues were properly before this Court, Plaintiff argues that the trial court did not
commit error.
Plaintiff also raises several issues on appeal. Plaintiff contends that the doctrine of
merger should not have precluded her negligent misrepresentation claim that was
7

dismissed in summary judgment. Plaintiff further asserts that the trial court erred in
dismissing 37 of her 42 original defects on her fraudulent nondisclosure claim as well as
dismissing 41 of her 42 original defects on her breach of contract claim. Lastly, Plaintiff
contends that the trial court erred in not awarding Plaintiff all of her attorney's fees and
costs on this matter.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT VERSION OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The Defendants contend that the trial court failed to correctly determine the
appropriate version of the statute of limitations in this case. Even if the trial court did
commit an error the Defendants failed to preserve the issue for appeal, the Defendants
invited the error and the error was harmless. The Plaintiff further argues that the trial
court correctly applied the appropriate version of the statute of limitations. 1
A.

Defendants Failed to Preserve this Issue for Appeal, Invited the
Alleged Error and the Alleged Error was Harmless.

"To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the
trial court, giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue." State v. Maguire, 975
P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847
(Utah 1998)). This Court is "precluded from reviewing it without a demonstration by

'Additionally, Defendants have failed to follow numerous Utah R. App. P. such as Rule
24(a)(8) requiring a Summary of the Argument, Rule 24(a)(7) requiring all facts to have a
reference to the record below and Rule 24(a)(9) by wholly failing to cite to the record in
their argument. Defendants failure to cite to the record is basis to assume correctness of
the trial court's findings and dismiss their claims on appeal. State v. Tucker, 675 P.2d
755, 756-757 (Utah 1982).
8

Defendant of plain error or exceptional circumstances." State v. Person, 2006 UT App
288 (Utah App. 2006). Defendants fail to allege plain error or exceptional circumstances
but instead make the inexplicable statement that they have indeed reserved this issue for
appeal. See Appellate Brief of Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Appellees Dan Smith
and Carol Smith pg. 1 (Hereinafter Defendants' Brief).
Defendants claim that the trial court applied the wrong version of the applicable
statute of limitations because it is impossible to know which version to apply without a
specific finding by the jury of when Mrs. Moore should have discovered the defect.
Defendants cite to five (5) different memorandums claiming that the issue was preserved
in each of the memorandums. However, upon a quick review of those memoranda it is
readily apparent that Defendants never objected to or questioned which version of the
statute should be applied and never objected to the trial courts method of determining
which version applied. At no point was this issue raised below, thus it was not preserved.
Additionally, the Defendants invited any error by proposing the 1999 version of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-21.5 was applicable. (R. 803, Appellants Addendum 2)
and quoted the exact language of the 1999 version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(3)(a-b) in their
memorandum. (R. 820, Appellants Addendum 2). The trial court agreed with
Defendants9 argument and applied the 1999 version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5. (R. 12731274, Appellants' Addendum 9). Furthermore, Defendants again agreed with the trial
court in their memorandum on the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict that
the 1999 version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 applied. (R. 2140, Appellants' Addendum 4).
"The doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then

9

complaining of it on appeal." Miller v. Martineau & Co., Certified Pub. Accountants,
983 P.2d 1107, 1116 (Utah App. 1999). As the Defendants themselves have led the trial
court down this path it would be inequitable to allow them to now claim the trial court
erred.
Furthermore, if there was error in applying the version of the statute of limitations,
this error was harmless. Defendants argue "It is readily apparent that the application of
either of the 1991 version, the 1997 version, or the 1999 version could result in a very
different outcome for Plaintiffs' claims depending on which version applied." See
Defendants' Brief pg. 17. Defendants fail to understand that the language in the various
versions of the statute would have no effect on the trial courts ruling because the court in
large part did not rely upon the language of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 as the basis for applying
the discovery rule. The Utah Supreme Court explained in Russell Packard Development,
Inc. v. Carson, 108P.3d741 (Utah 2005) an Equitable Discovery Rule (one not written
in the statute for fixed Statute of Limitations periods like in U.C.A. 78-12-21.5(3)(a)) can
be applied to toll a fixed statute of limitations. Defendants have failed to understand that
a Statutory Discovery Rule (one written into the statute like in U.C.A. 78-12-21.5(3)(b))
is not the only means of tolling a statute of limitations. Because the trial court relied
upon the theory of an equitable discovery rule, the language in the various statutes would
not have changed the "outcome for Plaintiffs". Therefore, Defendants dialogue on the
language of the various versions of the statute of limitations is moot and if there was an
error in applying this version of the statute of limitations it was harmless errorB
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B.

The Trial Court Did not Commit Error in Applying the Statute of
Limitations.

Defendants assert that the "trial court erred by non-discriminately applying the
2004 version of U.C.A. §78-12-21.5". See Defendants' Brief pg. 13. Defendants5
confusion on which version of the statute of limitations was applied is perplexing
considering the fact they originally suggested which version to apply! Even more
perplexing is how the trial court could apply the 2004 version of the statute of limitations
in an order entered on August 21, 2003. (R. 1274).
Defendants cite to Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629 (Utah
1995) for the proposition that the trial court was required to first have the jury determine
the exact date when Plaintiffs should have discovered the facts forming the cause of
actions before the appropriate version of the statute could have been determined. See
Defendants' Brief pg. 13. This is not the holding of Sevy or any other case that
Defendants have cited. In fact, the trial court in Sevy never determined an exact date of
when plaintiff should have discovered their cause of action but, as in the case at bar,
simply ruled that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations.
There is no requirement that a specific date must be established as to when it was
reasonable to discover the defects. All that is required is for the jury to determine that the
Plaintiffs should not have reasonably discovered the defects sooner. Even though there
was no specific finding of fact in the Special Verdict (R 2112), the jury obviously
concluded that the Moores should not have reasonably discovered the footings defects
before April of 2000. At trial Mrs. Moore presented evidence that she did not discover
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the footings defect until April 2000 when she was having a fence installed on her
property. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0120-0121). This defect was discovered because
it was necessary for the fence installers to dig a posthole next to the house for one of the
fence posts and the fence installers noticed the defect in the footings when they were
exposed. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0121-0123). Plaintiff argued that this was the
earliest reasonable date that she should have discovered the defects. (R. 2424 Jury Trial
Transcript 0591-0592). However, Defendants argued that Plaintiff should have
reasonably discovered the defects sooner. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0587-0589).
Obviously the jury concluded that April of 2000 was the earliest date Mrs. Moore should
have reasonably discovered the defects.2
Defendants further assert that there should have been findings of fact supporting
the trial court's conclusions of law. See Defendants' Brief pg. 20. Defendants' assertion
misinterprets the law. U.R.C.P. Rule 52(a) clearly states that the requirement for
Findings of Fact applies only to "actions tried upon the facts without a jury or an advisory
jury". Furthermore, the two cases cited by Defendants were cases where the judge was
the finder of fact and not a jury. Defendants' argument fails because no specific findings
of fact are required when a case is tried by jury.
Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run in April of 2000 and the trial
court did not err in applying the 1999 version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5.
II.

2

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN APPLYING THE
DISCOVERY RULE

See page 22 below for further explanation.
12

Defendants claim that the trial court inexplicably denied Defendants 5 various
motions regarding their statute of limitations defense because U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(3)(a)
does not state a written discovery rule in the statute. Apparently, Defendants have failed
to grasp the difference in a statutory discovery rule and an equitable discovery rule.
Defendants5 entire argument is based on the fact that no discovery rule is written or
provided in the language of the statute for the breach of contract claim. Defendants have
not realized that a statute of limitations can be tolled by the application of the equitable
discovery rule even when there is no written discovery rule in the applicable statute of
limitations. The Utah Supreme Court recently stated,
We have limited the circumstances in which an equitable discovery rule may
operate to toll an otherwise fixed statute of limitations period to the following two
situations: (1) 'where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct,5 and (2) 'where the
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has
prevented the discovery of the cause of action5.
Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 108 P.3d 741, 747 (Utah 2005); citations
omitted.
Clearly Plaintiff meets the first situation. The jury found that Defendants
fraudulently concealed the defect in the footings. (R. 212-213). Defendants 5 failure to
disclose and remedy the footings defect was the act that gave rise to Plaintiffs claims.
Because of Defendants concealment of this information, Plaintiff was not aware of any
defects in the home until April of 2000, two months after the six (6) year statute of
limitations had run. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0120-0121). This date was the
earliest Plaintiff should have reasonably discovered the defect. (R. 2424 Jury Trial
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Transcript 0591-0592). Therefore, the trial court appropriately applied the equitable
discovery rule based upon the Defendants concealment of their actions and the fact that
Plaintiffs actions were reasonable in not discovering her claims sooner.
Plaintiff also meets the second situation of exceptional circumstances. (R. 056061). To determine if exceptional circumstances exist the court uses a balancing test that
"weighs the hardship imposed on the claimant by the application of the statute of
limitations against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the passage of time."
Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). Surely the
hardship imposed on the Plaintiff in rigidly applying the statute of limitations in this case
clearly outweighs any prejudice that the Defendants possibly could suffer. Mrs. Moore's
breach of contract claim would be completely barred if the discovery rule was not
allowed to toll the statute of limitations. Such a result would be patently unfair and
inequitable especially since the jury found that the Defendants fraudulently concealed the
information that gave rise to Mrs. Moore's claims. (R. 212-213). Furthermore, Plaintiff
brought her suit in August of 2000; merely a few months after the six (6) year statute of
limitations had run. (R. 9). The Defendants have never argued that any evidence had
been lost through the passage of time and have not shown that they would be prejudiced
in any way except that they might now be accountable for their actions.
Not only does the equitable discovery rule toll the statute of limitations, but
U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(5) states that the statute of limitations does not apply to a
provider that "fraudulently concealed his act, error, omission, or breach of duty"... or
for a "willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty". Therefore, this
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statute of limitations would not even apply in this case because the jury found that the
Defendants fraudulently concealed their activities. See Interagatory 2(a) of the
Special Verdict (Addendum No. 10 of Defendants Brief).
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT SUBMIT QUESTIONS OF LAW TO
JURY

Defendants contend that the trial court committed reversible err when it submitted
a complicated question of law to the jury in the Special Verdict asking the jury to
determine whether each of Plaintiffs claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
See Defendants' Brief pg. 21-24. Defendants have failed to preserve this issue for appeal
and furthermore, a detailed review of the record clearly shows that the jury was not asked
to determine a question of law.
A.

Defendants Failed to Preserve this Issue for Appeal.

As stated above, a party must first raise an issue in the trial court in order to
preserve that issue on appeal. The Defendants never once raised any objections regarding
the wording of the Special Verdict; in-fact the Defendants reviewed the proposed Special
Verdict in chambers with the trial judge (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0549) and had no
objections whatsoever to the wording of the Special Verdict. (R. 2424 Jury Trial
Transcript 0552-0553). Defendants could have opposed the trial court's Special Verdict
and drafted a proposed Special Verdict with the language they felt was appropriate.
Defendants, however, failed to do this and agreed that the trial court's Special Verdict
was proper. Defendants admit that this issue was not preserved on appeal but claim that
the trial court plainly erred in submitting questions of law to the jury. See Defendants'

15

Brief pg. 2. The Utah Supreme Court has held that when a party considers the issue,
consciously decides to not object and affirmatively leads the trial court to believe that
there was nothing wrong with the instruction, then that party will be estopped from
claiming the manifest error [plain error] exception. State of Utah v. Medina, 738 P.2d
1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). This Court further stated that "under the doctrine of invited
error, we have declined to engage in even plain error review when 'counsel, either by
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no
objection to the [proceedings]." State v. Person, 2006 UT App 288 (Utah App. 2006)
(quoting State v. Winfield, 128 P.3d 1171 (Utah 2006)). Because Defendants failed to
object below, they should not be allowed to raise this issue on appeal.
Even if Defendants are not estopped from claiming the plain error exception,
Defendants fail to meet the standard of plain error. "To demonstrate plain error, a
defendant must establish that '(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant/" Berkshires, L.L.C. v. Sykes,
127 P.3d 1243, 1250-1251 (Utah App. 2005) (quoting State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346
(Utah 2000)). Defendants have not even attempted to show how the alleged error should
have been obvious to the trial court or how there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome. Further, Defendants have failed to follow Utah R. App. P. Rule
24(a)(9) by "including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial
court" in their argument. Therefore, this issue should not be reviewed by this Court.
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B.

The Jury was not Asked to Determine Legal Questions.

Defendants 5 contention that the Special Verdict requested the jury to make legal
determinations is simply incorrect. The question in the Special Verdict that Defendants
object to states, "do you find that the statute of limitations barred or prohibited the
Plaintiffs breach of contract claim?" (R. 2112). Looking at this question in isolation
could possibly be confusing as to who was deciding the legal question regarding the
statute of limitations. But, with a brief review of the record, it becomes clear that the jury
was not asked to decide any legal questions; instead the jury merely decided the exact
question Defendants propose in their brief. When should Plaintiff have reasonably
discovered the defects? See Defendants' Brief pg. 21.
A reading of the various motions for summary judgment, the trial court's orders on
those motions and the trial transcript make it abundantly clear that the trial court decided
the legal question of the applicability of the statutes of limitation and the discovery rule
with the jury deciding the reasonableness of Plaintiff s discovery of the defect. The trial
court stated in its order on the first motion for summary judgment that,
"With respect to the remaining claims, the Court believes that the discovery rule
should be applied to toll the statute of limitations, even as to contract-based
claims, in situations where its application is not otherwise expressly prohibited by
law. Accordingly, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the discovery rule
does apply in this case with respect to those defects that would be considered
latent, and that there remain issues of fact with respect to when those defects
should have reasonably been discovered^
(R. 154) emphasis added. The trial court's Memorandum Decision in August of 2003
reiterates that the legal questions of the application of the statutes of limitation and the
discovery rule had already been decided and the only questions left were questions of fact
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regarding when Plaintiff should have discovered the defects. (R. 1273-1274). That alone
shows that the trial court appropriately decided the legal questions regarding the statutes
of limitation and the application of the discovery rule.
With a further review of the closing arguments by both parties and the jury
instructions, it becomes unmistakable that the jury was really deciding the reasonableness
of Mrs. Moore's discovery of the footing defect in April of 2000. Jury Instruction #25
and #26 refer to Plaintiffs duty to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the
defects and the jury's duty to determine the reasonableness of Plaintiff s actions. (R.
2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0563-0564). Jury Instruction #31 refers to the statute of
limitations. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0565). This jury instruction is word for word
identical to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction #30. (R. 1936). Defendant and
Plaintiff proposed different jury instructions regarding the statute of limitations and
discovery rule with Defendants prevailing by having the majority of their language being
used in the final jury instructions. (R. 2022; 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0565-0566). The
language in Jury Instruction #31 stating that the statute of limitations for a cause of action
for construction defects based on contract is six years came directly from Defendants
Proposed Jury Instruction #30. (R. 1936). The first part of Jury Instruction #32 is word
for word identical to Defendants Proposed Jury Instruction #31. (R. 1937; 2424 Jury
Trial Transcript 0565-0566). The last part of Jury Instruction #32 dealing with the
discovery rule was proposed by the Plaintiff but was not included in its entirety. (R.
2022, 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0565-0566).
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In closing arguments, Defendants' counsel argued that Mrs. Moore in-fact did
discover the defects before April of 2000 and argued that even if she did not, she should
have discovered the defects before April of 2000. They argued that she was unreasonable
in failing to have a home inspected when she purchased the home. (R. 2424 Jury Trial
Transcript 0586-0590). They even ask the jury the exact question that they now claim
should have been in the Special Verdict, when should Plaintiff have discovered the
defects through reasonable diligence? (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0588 line 10-11).
Plaintiffs counsel then explained the discovery rule and how it worked. (R. 2424
Jury Trial Transcript 0591). Plaintiffs counsel argued that Mrs. Moore was not aware of
the defects until April of 2000 and that she could not have reasonably discovered the
defects sooner. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0120-0121 and 0591-0592). It was stated
that pursuant to the discovery rule, the six (6) year statute of limitations would not run
until after Plaintiff discovered the defects. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0589 line 2324). Plaintiff argued that she did not have a duty to have the home inspected and that she
was reasonable in not having the home inspected. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0593).
Upon this detailed review of the trial court's past orders, Jury Instructions and
arguments given to the jury, it becomes clear that the jury was not requested to decide an
issue of law. The general question in the Special Verdict was not asking the jury to
determine the applicability of the statute of limitations (as that was already ruled on by
the trial judge) but to determine if Mrs. Moore should have reasonably discovered the
defects before April of 2000. The jury found that Mrs. Moore did not discover the
defects until April of 2000 and that she acted reasonably. (R. Hearing On Motions June
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6, 2005 pg. 0008-0009).

Therefore the six (6) year statute of limitations did not run on

her breach of contract claim and the two (2) year statute of limitations did not run on her
fraudulent nondisclosure claim.
Lastly, as can be seen through the above analysis, this legal question is extremely
fact-sensitive and Defendants should have marshaled all the evidence in support of the
courts usage of the Special Verdict question. United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 WL 1528607 (Utah 2006). This argument is further
explained below but applies to this issue as well and Defendants should be prevented
from appealing this issue without marshalling the evidence.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DEFENDANTS
HAD A VALID FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE CLAIM

Defendants assert that the trial court erred in not dismissing Plaintiffs fraudulent
nondisclosure claim. Defendants have failed to marshal all the evidence that supports the
trial courts rulings and the trial court did not err in denying Defendants various motions
on the fraudulent nondisclosure claim as to the defect in the footings.
A-

Defendants Have Failed in Their Duty to Marshal the Evidenceo

When an appellant challenges a trial court's ruling regarding a motion for directed
verdict "the appellant is obligated to first marshal the evidence in support of the verdict
and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict." Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724, 727 (Utah App. 2002).
Defendants assert that their appeal related to the various motions for summary judgment
is a "question of law". However, this does not relieve them of their duty to marshal the
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evidence if the "correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely factsensitive." United Park City Mines Co. at If 25.
In Bearden v. Wardley Corp., 72 P.3d 144, 148 (Utah App. 2003) the appellant
appealed the trial court's ruling on his motion for summary judgment and/or directed
verdict, exactly what Defendants in this case have done. In Bearden, this Court held that
the appellant was required to marshal the evidence and that his failure to marshal such
evidence made his claim on appeal lack merit. Id.
Defendants have craftily attempted to frame this issue as a legal question but the
label that Defendants have given the issue does not preclude them from marshaling the
evidence. The Utah Supreme Court stated "that the labels given particular issues by
courts or counsel are not determinative. Rather, the critical element triggering the duty to
marshal is factual inquiry. Parties seeking appellate review must marshal the evidence on
those questions that require substantive factual inquiry..." United Park City Mines Co. at
\ 38. Clearly this issue requires substantive factual inquiry. Defendants refer to
numerous facts that they believe support their contention and state, "Based on the
foregoing admitted facts, the trial court should have granted summary judgment..." See
Defendant's Brief pg. 31-33. Even though Defendants referred to all the facts that they
believe support their argument, they have failed to refer to or cite the facts that support
the courts ruling and have failed to argue how those facts support the courts rulings.
If Defendants were excused in the failure to cite to the record and to marshal the
evidence, Plaintiff or this Court would then have the burden of attempting to locate this
information and marshal evidence that supports the trial courts findings. The Utah
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Supreme Court further stated, "We repeatedly have warned of the grim consequences
parties face when they fail to fulfill the marshaling requirement. When parties fail to
perform this critical task, we can rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings
of fact". United Park City Mines Co. at \ 27. Plaintiff therefore requests that this Court
affirm the lower courts rulings on their fraudulent nondisclosure claim.
B.

Plaintiff Has a Valid Fraudulent Nondisclosure Claim as to the
Footings,

Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs claim for fraudulent nondisclosure should
have been dismissed as a matter of law because the Plaintiff failed to get a professional
home inspection. See Defendants' Brief pg. 30. Defendants cite to Maack v. Resource
Design and Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah. App. 1994), Schafir v. Harrigan, 879
P.2d 1385 (Utah App. 1994) and Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572 (Utah 2001) to
support their claim. Defendants' argument completely misstates the law.
The elements for Fraudulent Nondisclosure are (1) the nondisclosed information is
material, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, and
(3) there is a legal duty to communicate. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 242 (Utah
2002). Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff failed to meet the first two elements of
fraudulent nondisclosure but only argue that Defendants had no duty to disclose the
footing defect because it could have been discovered by a professional home inspection.
None of the cases quoted by the Defendants hold that a professional home inspection is
required by law. Defendants had a duty to reveal any defects that were not discoverable
by reasonable care on the part of Plaintiff. Mitchell at 575. Therefore, if Plaintiff could

22

not discover the defect by reasonable care then Defendants had a duty to reveal that
defect.
In Maack this Court held that the plaintiff in that case was unreasonable in not
having his home inspected. However, that holding was in support of that trial court's
findings and not contrary to them. Furthermore, this Court stated that Maack presented
"a close call, we hold that under these circumstances Jarvik [defendant] had no legal duty
to disclose his doubts, if any, about the integrity of the stucco." Maack at 579. This
Court specifically stated that the "question of whether a duty exists is answered by
reference to all the circumstances of the case and by comparing the facts not disclosed
with the object and end in view by the contracting parties." Id. 578. Therefore, the
question of whether Defendant had a duty to reveal a defect or if Plaintiff was reasonable
in not discovering a defect is not normally a question of law but a fact intensive inquiry.
This Court's finding that Maack was not reasonable in failing to have a
professional home inspection was based on completely distinguishable facts. In Maack
the plaintiff purchased the home from a third party owner who was not the builder; the
house had been completed and lived in for over a year by the third party owner; there was
no privity of contract between the buyer and the builder; and the third party owner did
disclose some defects in the home putting the buyer on notice that there are defects in the
home. Unlike Maack, Mrs. Moore had no reason to undertake a home inspection in this
case. Mrs. Moore, purchased the home directly from Defendant Dan Smith who was a
licensed contractor who had constructed over 200 homes in Utah (R. 806-807, 964); Dan
Smith represented to them that he was a home builder (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript
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0090); the certificate of occupancy was issued just a few short weeks before the Moores
purchased the home (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0593); the Moores walked through the
home before entering into the EMSA and Defendants did not disclose any defects to the
Moores that might put them on notice of potential problems (R. 1270); Plaintiffs
affirmatively asked if there was anything they needed to know about the house relating to
any problems and Mr. Smith answered in the negative that it was a new house (R. 2424
Jury Trial Transcript 0103, 0199); this was the Moores first purchase of a stick built
home (R. 964); and the Moores had no experience or expertise in construction (R. 1269,
2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0044, 0085).
Defendants had a duty to disclose any defect that was not discoverable by
reasonable care. The proper standard for reasonable care is "whether the defect would be
apparent to ordinary prudent persons with like experience, not to persons with specialized
knowledge in the field of construction or real estate." Mitchell at 575. Plaintiff argued
that the question of her reasonableness was a question of fact for the jury to decide. (R.
971). See Illott v. University of Utah, 12 P.3d 1011 (Utah App. 2000). The trial court
agreed that this was a question of fact for the jury. (R. 154). These arguments were
presented to the jury at trial. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0563-0565, 0586-0590,
0593). The jury ruled that Mrs. Moore's actions were reasonable in not having the home
professionally inspected when she purchased it. (R. Hearing On Motions June 6, 2005
pg. 0008-0009).
Defendants discuss the "as is" clause found in the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement (hereinafter EMSA) but fail to brief their arguments regarding this clause.
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Therefore, Plaintiff assumes that Defendants referred to this clause as an argument to
Mrs. Moore's unreasonableness in failing to have a home inspection. As shown above,
this was a question for the jury to decide and the "as is" clause argument was presented to
the jury. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript 0574). Defendants' argument that Mrs. Moore
was unreasonable in failing to have a home inspection must fail because this is a question
of fact that the jury decided in favor of Mrs. Moore.
V,

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFF'S FRAUDULENT
NONDISCLOSURE CLAIM

In its Memorandum Decision on Defendants' second Motion for Summary
Judgment filed August 21, 2003 the trial court ruled that when the Smiths sold the home
to Mrs. Moore the home was "used" and therefore the doctrine of caveat emptor applied
to preclude Mrs. Moores fraudulent nondisclosure claim as to any defects in the home
that were patent. (R. 1272). Further, the trial court ruled that all of the 42 defects in the
home were patent except for 5 defects, thereby eliminating the vast majority of Plaintiff s
recoverable damages on her fraudulent nondisclosure claim. The standard of review
from a district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness, granting no deference to the district court. Swan Creek Vill Homeowners
Ass 'n v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122, 1126 (Utah 2006). When reviewing an order granting
summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Culp Constr. Co. v.
Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650, 651 (Utah 1990).
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A*

The Trial Court Erred in Ruling that All But Five of the Defects in
Plaintiffs Home were Patent

The trial court held in its Memorandum Decision on Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment that "Plaintiffs admitted that all of the defects items [sic] except
items number 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, 39 were patent and that they could have been
discovered by a home inspection. Therefore, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, and
the court grants the Defendants motion for Summary Judgment regarding the admitted
patent items because they could have reasonably been discovered by the Plaintiffs." (R.
1272). To understand the basis for this ruling the following procedural history of the case
is necessary.
On October 9, 2002 Defendants filed their Second Set of Requests for Admissions
which contained two-hundred and sixty-eight requests for admissions. (R. 243, 527).
Plaintiff objected to the requests for admissions for various reasons but specifically
objected to a request to admit that the defects discovered in the home were not "latent".
This objection was on the basis that the request was vague and ambiguous and that it
sought impermissible conclusions of law. (R. 527-530). Ultimately the Defendants
brought a motion to compel discovery to force Plaintiff to answer these admissions. (R.
390). Over Plaintiffs objection the trial court mandated that Plaintiff answer this request
for admission and mandated that Plaintiff use the trial court's definition of "latent"
meaning hidden. (R. 759, 968, 1624). Plaintiff was then bound to answer the Defendants
request which of the 42 defects were not latent. Based on the court's order Plaintiff was
required to admit that all but defects no. 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38 and 39 of the original 42
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defects in the home were in fact not "latent" or were not visibly hidden. (R. 1624).
These admissions were based solely on the trial court's mandated definition of "latent" as
hidden and not on any legal definition of a "latent" defect pertaining to the doctrine of
caveat emptor.
On May 6, 2003 Defendants filed their second Motion for Summary Judgment
with a 28 page Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R. 802). In their memorandum Defendants stated as an undisputed fact that all but seven
(7) of the defects in the home were in fact patent (visible). (R. 812). Defendants then
argued that all defects that were not latent were barred by the doctrine of caveat emptor
(which apparently still governs the sale of used homes in Utah). (R. 825-829). Plaintiffs
vehemently disputed Defendants' proposed Undisputed Fact that all but seven of the
defects were patent as it pertains to the doctrine of caveat emptor. (R. 962, 958-959 and
Transcript Motions Hearing July 21, 2003 pg. 0034, 0044-0046).
Based on these so-called admissions the trial court incorrectly granted summary
judgment for fraudulent nondisclosure on all but 7 of the 42 defects. As already stated
above, a claim for fraudulent nondisclosure has three elements, 1) the nondisclosed
information is material, 2) the nondisclosed information known to the party failing to
disclose and 3) that party had a duty to communicate the information. The trial court
stated in its Memorandum Decision the correct standard of Defendants duty to
communicate stating:
A duty to disclose in a vendor-vendee transaction of a used home exists only
where a defect is "not discoverable by reasonable care," and if the defect could be
discovered by reasonable care, the doctrine of caveat emptor prevails and
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precludes recovery by the vendee. Mitchell, 31 P.3d at 575; Maack v. Resource
Design & Const, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 579 (Utah App. 1994). The standard of
reasonable care is whether the defect would be apparent to ordinary prudent
person with like experience, not to persons with specialized knowledge in the
field of construction or real estate. Mitchell, 31 PJd at 575.
(R. 1272) emphasis added. In Ilott v. University of Utah, the Court of Appeals quotes
Black's Law Dictionary as defining the term 'latent defect' as "a defect which reasonably
careful inspection will not reveal." 12 P.3d 1011 (Utah App. 2000) quoting Black's Law
Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). Black's Law Dictionary also defines a 'patent defect' as
"a defect that is apparent to a normally observant person esp. a buyer on a reasonable
inspection." Black's Law Dictionary (7 ed. 1999) emphasis added. Thus a patent
defect is one that an ordinary buyer without any specialized knowledge in the field of
construction or real estate would discover upon a reasonable inspection by the buyer. A
clear example of a patent defect would be a large crack in the wall or wires protruding
out of a light fixture. Consequently, latent defects can be defects that are in plain view,
but are not apparent to an ordinary buyer without specialized knowledge in construction.
In summary, the Smiths had a duty to reveal all known material "latent" defects as
"latent" is defined by Utah law.
Plaintiffs forced admissions of what defects were not "latent" were based on a
secular definition of "latent" meaning hidden from sight that the trial court mandated
Plaintiff to use. Plaintiff was required to answer these requests based on this definition
and not based upon the definition of "latent" defects as defined by Utah case law.
Defendant most definitely would have answered these Requests for Admissions
differently if the correct legal definition of "latent" defect was given by the trial court.
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It is easy to conceive of a defect in a home that is in plain visible view but would
not be apparent or discovered by reasonable care from an ordinary prudent buyer. For
example, attics require a certain amount of ventilation area or the attic will get extremely
hot which can cause problems in the home like the shingles warping and falling off. An
ordinary prudent buyer would have no knowledge or expertise that would allow him to
discover that a home is significantly lacking in attic ventilation. Even though the attic
vents are completely visible, an ordinary prudent person would not discover this defect
therefore it would be considered a "latent" defect pursuant to Illot which the owner would
have to disclose if he had knowledge of it. This argument was presented to the trial court
below. (R. Transcript Motions Hearing July 21, 2003 pg. 0045-0046 and Transcript
Motions Hearing April 1, 2004 pg. 0064-0065, 0068-0069). It is clear that the trial courts
definition of "latent" defect that Plaintiff was required to use did not coincide with the
definition of a "latent" defect defined by this Court in Illot. Therefore the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment based on these so-called admissions because
virtually all the defects in the Moore's home were "latent" as that term was defined by
this Court in Illot.
B.

The Trial Court Improperly Invaded the Province of the Jury in
Granting Summary Judgment as to Defects No. 12 and 38.

In its Memorandum Decision on Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment the
trial court further held that defect items number 12 and 38 were items "that could have
reasonably been discovered by the Plaintiffs". (R. 1273). In-fact, defect number 38 was
the exact defect which was just used in the example above, lack of adequate attic
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ventilation. This issue should not have been decided by the trial judge as this is a
question of reasonableness. The question is, should the Moores have discovered these
defects if they had used reasonable care? "Questions of reasonableness necessarily pose
questions of fact which should be reserved for jury resolution. Only in the clearest cases
should such questions be resolved in summary judgment situations." Ilott at 1014 (Utah
App. 2000) quoting Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Plaintiff contends that defects 12 and 38 were not, as a mater of law, a clear case able to
be resolved at summary judgment; rather, this was a question of reasonableness which
should have been left for the jury to determine. (R. 1272).
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Ruling that Plaintiffs Purchased a "Used"
Home.

Pursuant to the current status of the doctrine of caveat emptor in Utah it appears
that the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply in the sale of new residential homes.
The trial court stated,
In the sale of new homes, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of
caveat emptor has eroded, but in the area of used residences it is "reasonable to
hold the purchaser to the caveat emptor doctrine." See, Shafir v. Harrigan, 879
P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah App. 1994)(quoting, Utah State Medical Ass'n v. Utah
State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1982).
(R. 1271). Therefore, for the doctrine of caveat emptor to apply in this case, the home
that Mrs. Moore purchased would have to be "used".
Plaintiff argued that the doctrine of caveat emptor did not even apply to this case
because Plaintiff bought a "new" home and because Plaintiff met "standards of when
caveat emptor does not apply". (R. 965-966). Plaintiff argued that she bought the home
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directly from an experienced builder who had built over 200 homes; the certificate of
occupancy on the home was issued only a few weeks before the Moores signed the
EMS A; no other party except for the builder had lived in the home, the builder had only
lived in the home for a short period before the EMSA was signed and this was the
Moores first home purchase and they were inexperienced in the area of construction and
real estate. (R. 966).
All facts and any inferences that could be drawn from them should have been
viewed in a light most favorable to Mrs. Moore since she was opposing the motion for
summary judgment. In spite of this, the trial court found "the Home is a used home
because the Smiths intended it to be their home, they lived in the Home for a short period
of time, and Plaintiffs have admitted these facts." (R. 1272).
The trial court based this decision on a supposed admission of fact by Plaintiff in a
prior motion for summary judgment filed two years previous to the above ruling. (R.
1272). In February of 2001, Defendants' filed their first motion for summary judgment
and they claimed as an undisputed fact that they had built the home "for their own
residence" and that the Defendants had lived in the home for a short period of time. (R.
29). In Plaintiffs' opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs stated that
"for purposes of this motion" only, they did not contest any of Defendants' "Undisputed
Facts". (R. 52). This first motion for summary judgment was before any fact discovery
had taken place (R. 1620) and Plaintiff felt confident at that point that the law alone
would preclude summary judgment on those issues. Indeed, the trial court denied
Defendants' motion to all issues except negligent misrepresentation. (R. 152). The trial
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court did not make any findings of fact on the first motion for summary judgment. (R.
152). After this motion was denied, nearly two years of discovery took place and
Plaintiff discovered additional facts that led her to not believe Defendants assertions. (R.
1621). On May 6, 2003 Defendants filed their second motion for summary judgment
where they again claimed as an undisputed fact that they had built this home for their
own residence. (R. 806). In Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition on the second motion
for summary judgment Plaintiff vehemently disputed this fact. (R. 958). However, the
trial court held that "In this case, Plaintiffs did not dispute that the Smiths lived in the
Home or that the Smiths intended it to be their home in their response to Defendants'
first Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore, it is an admission." (R. 1272) (emphasis
added).
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in holding that Plaintiffs failure to
contest a fact in a prior motion for summary judgment means that the fact is deemed
admitted for a later motion for summary judgment and trial. Plaintiff specifically limited
the admission of this fact to the first motion for summary judgment, no findings of fact
were made on the first motion, that motion was before any fact discovery had taken place
and Plaintiff vehemently refuted that fact in the second motion for summary judgment.
(R. Transcript Motions Hearing April 1, 2004 pg. 0066-0068). Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in the pertinent part, "Each fact set forth in the
moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless controverted by the responding party." (emphasis added). Plaintiff acknowledges
that the lack of contesting the facts were admissions for purposes of the first Motion for
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Summary Judgment, but she does not believe that she should be held to that at a
subsequent Motion for Summary Judgment especially considering the facts in this case.
The trial court erred in ruling that the Moores home was "used" based on this so-called
admission.
Even if those facts were deemed admitted in regard to the second motion for
summary judgment, the trial court still erred in ruling that the home was "used" and the
doctrine of discovery applied. Defendant's never claimed that the home was "used" in
their undisputed facts. Plaintiff never admitted in either the first or second motion that
the home was "used". In any event, even Plaintiff did admitted that the Smiths built their
home for their own residence and that they lived in it for a short time, this does not mean
that the home should be legally defined as "used" for the purposes of caveat emptor. The
Smiths built the home and Mr. Smith was a very experienced licensed general contractor.
The Smiths only lived in the home for 3 weeks after the certificate of occupancy was
given to the time the EMSA was signed. An experienced licensed general contractor
should not be able to live in a home for a very brief time for the purpose classifying that
home as "used" so the doctrine of caveat emptor can apply to the sale of the home. If this
Court sanctioned such a holding then certainly it may become a customary habit for some
general contractors to live in a home for a few short weeks and then sell it to an
unsuspecting buyer who thinks he is buying a "new" home, when in-fact he may be
buying a "used" home in which the doctrine of caveat emptor applies. When these facts
are construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the trial court should not have ruled
that the home was "used" and that the doctrine of caveat emptor applied.
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D.

In Light of Smith v. Frandsen, Has Utah Abandoned the Doctrine of
Caveat Emptor in the Sale of "Used" Residential Housing?

The application of the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of "new" and "used"
residential housing is anything but clear in the state of Utah. This Court stated in Maack
that "that Utah does not currently recognize an implied warranty of habitability relating
to the construction of residential property and instead continues to adhere to the
traditional rule of caveat emptor." Maack at 582. However, the Utah Supreme Court has
stated that the doctrine of caveat emptor has eroded in the sale of new homes, but in the
area of used residences it is "reasonable to hold the purchaser to the caveat emptor
doctrine." Shafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah App. 1994) quoting, Utah
State Medical Ass 'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah
1982).
In, Smith v. Frandesen, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004) the Utah Supreme Court recently
expounded on this issue:
As a result of their superior knowledge, residential home-builders in other
jurisdictions have consistently been held liable to subsequent as well as immediate
purchasers. Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Welter, 663 P.2d 1041, 1044-45
(Colo. 1983) (citing cases from eight different states in which subsequent
purchasers were held able to state a claim for negligence against a builder); see
also Timothy E. Travers, American Law of Products Liability § 38:19 (3d
ed.1987); Michael A. DeSabatino, Liability of Builder of Residence for Latent
Defects Therein as Running to Subsequent Purchasers from Original Vendee, 10
A.L.R.4th 385 (1981). Just as the lack of purchaser sophistication motivated the
initial exceptions to the doctrine of caveat emptor, the expansion of buildercontractor liability to encompass even remote purchasers is similarly driven. Like
initial consumers of residential construction, subsequent homeowners typically
possess no greater sophistication that would enable them to discover latent defects
in the property. Tusch Enters, v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022, 1034
(1987) (" 'The same policy considerations that lead to [our adoption of the
implied warranty of habitability for sales of new homes] ... are equally
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applicable to subsequent homebuyers.' " (quoting Richards v. Powercraft
Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427, 430 (1984))); see also Dwight F.
Hopewell, C. Oates v. Jag: Let the Buyer Beware-A Remedy for Subsequent
Purchasers of Homes in North Carolina, 64 N.C. L.Rev. 1485, 1493 (1986) ("[A]
subsequent purchaser of real estate is in a very similar position to that of the
initial purchaser. Both are innocent purchasers who lack the expertise and
knowledge necessary to uncover every latent defect.... Thus, both classes of
purchasers deserve equal protection").
Smith v. Frandsen^ 94 P.3d at 926-927 (emphasis added). Based on the holding in Smith
v. Frandsen it appears that the Supreme Court of Utah adopted an implied warranty of
habitability to the sale of all residential homes and abandoned the doctrine of caveat
emptor. If this is the case, then the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of caveat
emptor to this case. However, if the doctrine of caveat emptor has not been abandoned in
the sale of "used" residential housing, Plaintiff would request that this Court certify this
appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 43 so that the Utah Supreme Court can decide if
this doctrine should be abandoned in the sale of "used" residential construction.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF
CONTRACT CLAIM

On November 17, 2003 Defendants filed five more motions for summary
judgment, one of which sought to dismiss Plaintiffs breach of contract claim for the third
time. (R. 1377). Defendants main argument relied upon language in Paragraph "C" of
the EMSA. Paragraph "C" states:
C. SELLER WARRANTIES- Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has receiyed no
claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property
which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against
the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances
of any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing,
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heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing.
(Appellants Addendum No. 7.) (emphasis added). Defendants argued that under this
Paragraph, "The Building Inspector gave no notice of any such claims except possibly the
finish grading. No other contract claim could fit in this provision." (R. 1381-1382).
Apparently the trial court agreed with Defendants interpretation and their 'notice'
argument because it ruled that "the only alleged defect that could fit within the terms of
Paragraph "C" was item 27 (the matter of finish grading and the minimum frost line
depth of the dirt around the house)." The trial court dismissed all other defects as it
related to the breach of contract issue. (R. 1750).
Plaintiff admitted that Paragraph C was the only warranty specifically given to
Plaintiff for which Plaintiff based her breach of contract claim. (R. 1528c). However,
Plaintiff argued that Defendants did have notice of all the defects and, because
Defendants personally built the home, they either knew or should have known of these
defects. (R. 1528c-d). Plaintiff asserted that Dan Smith was aware of the manner in
which he built the house, he was knowledgeable of the standards of the Uniform Building
Code (UBC) and that he was personally held to the standards of the UBC. (R. 1528d).
Furthermore, Plaintiffs argued that the Building Inspector discussed many of the defects
in the home with the Defendants so that was notice as well. (R. Transcript Motions
Hearing April 1, 2004 pg. 0023-0025). Lastly, Plaintiff asserted that at least the attic
ventilation was not in proper working condition at the time of closing as warrantied in
Paragraph C(c). (R. 1528e-f).
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Defendants then made the outrageous argument that Dan Smith could have known
of these defects and he still would not have been in breach of Paragraph C. Defendants
stated, "One 'receives' notice from another, not from himself. One 'receives' notice of a
building code violation from a building inspector. He may already know there is a
violation but he does not 'receive a notice or claim' from himself." (R. 1532; Transcript
Motions Hearing April 1, 2004 pg. 0011). Defendants argued that "unless the Building
Code Inspector "red-tagged" an item as a violation of the building code" then there could
be no notice and that item must be dismissed from Plaintiffs breach of contract claim.3
(R. 1733). Defendants argued that the Building Inspector issued a certificate of
occupancy and approved all items with the exception that he allowed the finished grating
around the house to be done after winter was over. Defendants admitted that there was a
disputed fact about the finished grating around the house and this was the only defect that
the Defendants could have possible had notice of. (R. 1733).
A,

The Trial Court Erred in Interpreting Paragraph " C " of the EMSA.

Black's Law Dictionary defines Notice as, "A person has notice of a fact or
condition if that person (1) has actual knowledge of it; (2) has received a notice of it; (3)
has reason to know about it; (4) knows about a related fact; or (5) is considered as having
been able to ascertain it by checking an official filing or recording." Further it defines
implied notice as, "Notice that is inferred from facts that a person had a means of

3

Taken to its logical extreme, Defendants argument allows all licensed general
contractors to claim no notice of building code violations as long as the building
inspector passes them off. This is not only directly contrary to the Uniform Building
Code but is not the legal definition of notice.
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knowing and that is thus imputed to that person; actual notice of facts or circumstances
that, if properly followed up, would have led to a knowledge of the particular fact in
question. — Also termed indirect notice; presumptive notice" Black's Law Dictionary
(7 ed. 1999). Utah Law defines actual notice as being "personal knowledge".
Diversified Equities, Inc. v. Amercan Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App.
1987). Therefore, pursuant to the legal definition of "notice", Dan Smith had notice of
the defects if he had knowledge of them or if he had reason to know of them.
The Supreme Court of Utah expounded the issue of notice and knowledge for a
builder in Utah. The Supreme Court stated that "a licensed general contractor in the state
of Utah, and like developers, the law imputes to builders and contractors a high degree of
specialized knowledge and expertise with regard to residential construction." Frandesen
at 925. In Frandsen, the builder (GT) had "no prior construction experience" but the
Supreme Court stated, "Nevertheless, GT is deemed to possess the knowledge of a
reasonably prudent builder-contractor under similar circumstances, and, as a matter of
law, a builder of ordinary prudence would have discovered the insufficient compaction
on lot 223." Id. Therefore, even if Mr. Smith truly had no actual knowledge of the
defects in the home, the law does impute to him knowledge or notice of these defects if a
reasonable prudent builder would have known of these defects.4 The trial court erred in
ruling that Defendants had not received notice of any defect in the home except as to the
footing defect.

4

This conclusion is supported by the UBC Sec. 205 & the second paragraph of 305(a).
(R. 1000-1001).
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Plaintiffs further presented evidence to the trial court that Dan Smith received
actual notice of the attic ventilation defect and of the defect in the stairs by the building
inspector. (R. Transcript Motions Hearing April 1, 2004 pg. 0023-0025). Therefore,
even if Defendants interpretation of the contract was correct, the trial court should not
have dismissed these defects.
Lastly, the trial court also erred in dismissing the defect regarding the attic
ventilation because Paragraph C(c) warrants that all ventilating systems would be in
proper working order at the time of closing. Certainly when the Plaintiff closed on the
house, no more attic ventilation existed than when the Moores discovered this defect in
the home so it was not in proper working order at the time of closing. Therefore, Plaintiff
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's order and reinstate all defects
relating to her Breach of Contract Claim.
VIL

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM

In the trial court's Order on Defendant's first Motion for Summary Judgment the
trial court ruled that Plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation claim was barred as a matter
of law by the doctrine of merger as set forth in Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 21 P.3d 219
(Utah App. 2000). (R. 153). The trial court erred because the doctrine of merger does
not apply in this case due to the specific language in the abrogation clause of the EMS A
and because the collateral rights exception applies.
A.

The Doctrine of Merger Does not Apply Because of the Specific
Language in the Abrogation Clause.
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The EMS A states that the warranty would survive the giving of the deed.
Therefore, none of the four exceptions to the merger doctrine is needed for the Plaintiffs'
claim of negligent misrepresentation to survive the giving of the deed. Accordingly, the
doctrine of merger does not apply.
In Pavoni v. Nielsen, 999 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 2000), the court of appeals held
that a warranty in the earnest money agreement survived the delivery of the deed when an
abrogation clause stated that it would not be abrogated. In Pavoni the earnest money
agreement included a warranty that "Seller agrees to install additional 3-inch gravel from
the driveway entrance on the property to 20 feet beyond...". Id. at 596. The earnest
money agreement also contained an abrogation clause that stated, "Except for express
warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents
shall abrogate this Agreement." Id. at 596. The trial court held that the Nielsens had no
duty to perform this warranty because the warranty was abrogated when the deed was
given; the doctrine of merger precluded the warranty. But the Appellate court reversed
this ruling, stating,
"Nielsen argues that the abrogation clause extinguished any rights the Pavonis had
under the earnest money agreement because all terms merged into the deed.
However, by the plain language of the abrogation clause, the express warranties in
the earnest money agreement survived the delivery of the deed. "Except for
express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing
documents shall abrogate this Agreement." Under the earnest money agreement,
delivery of the gravel was warrantied, and survived the deed. Thus, the trial court
erred in concluding that the earnest money agreement terms were abrogated and
merged into the deed. Whether this warranty was performed, and if not, what, if
any, damages the Pavonis suffered, are questions for the jury."
Id. at 596.
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It is interesting to note that the EMSA between the Moores and Smiths had the
exact same language as the EMSA in Pavoni. Paragraph O of the EMSA signed by the
Defendants on February 15, 1994 states, "O. ABROGATION. Except for express
warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents
shall abrogate this Agreement." Paragraph C of the EMSA states in part, "SELLER
WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim or notice of any
building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not or which will not be
remedied prior to closing." See Defendants Addendum No. 7. It is obvious that
according to the holding in Pavoni that this warranty survived the giving of the deed and
was not precluded by the doctrine of merger. Mrs. Moore's claim for negligent
misrepresentation is based upon this warranty language in the EMSA. Language in a
contract can be the basis for a claim of misrepresentation; it does not have to be a verbal
communication. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah 1974). Plaintiff argued that
the Defendants never intended to remedy the building violations and their warranty that
they would remedy defects was therefore a misrepresentation of their state of mind. "It is
settled that a misrepresentation of a present promissory intention is a misrepresentation of
a presently existing fact." Maack at 584. This warranty is the representation that was
made either carelessly or negligently by the Defendants. Furthermore, the Defendants
were in a superior position to know the material facts, they had a pecuniary interest in the
transaction and should have reasonably foreseen that the Moores were likely to rely upon
the warranty. Since this warranty survives the giving of the deed, then so does Mrs.
Moore's claim for negligent misrepresentation. They are one in the same.
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In Robinson v. Tripco supra, the court held that doctrine of merger precluded
Robinsons' claim for negligent misrepresentation. However, the plaintiffs1 claim of
negligent misrepresentation in that case was not based on a specific warranty that was
written into the earnest money sales agreement, as is here, but was based on a
conversation. Furthermore, there was not an abrogation clause in Tripco that specifically
stated that the warranties would not be abrogated at the time of the giving of the deed, as
is in the present case. The abrogation clause in the Plaintiffs EMS A specifically bars the
doctrine of merger from applying. The trial court therefore erred in granting summary
judgment on Plaintiffs negligent nondisclosure claim.
B.

Plaintiff's Claim for Negligent Misrepresentation Also Falls Under the
Collateral Rights Exception,

Even if the doctrine of merger applied, Plaintiffs claim for negligent
misrepresentation falls under the exception of collateral rights to the doctrine of merger.
The reason the trial court dismissed the Moores5 claim for negligent
misrepresentation was because it believed that the Tripco held that negligent
misrepresentation can not survive the giving of the deed, or in other words, it was
precluded by the doctrine of merger under all circumstances. (R. 153, Transcript
Motions Hearing May 31, 2001 pg. 0048-0049). This, however, is not true. Tripco held
that negligent misrepresentation does not fall under the fraud exception of the doctrine of
merger. The doctrine of merger has four exceptions: (1) mutual mistake in the drafting of
the final documents; (2) ambiguity in the final documents; (3) existence of rights
collateral to the contract of sale; (4) fraud in the transaction." Id. at 222. In Tripco the
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plaintiffs, unlike the present case, argued that their negligent misrepresentation claim fell
only under the fraud exception. This Court held that although fraud and negligent
misrepresentation are similar, negligent misrepresentation does not fall under the fraud
exception.
In Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah App. 1993), this
Court held as it pertains to collateral rights exception:
"The collateral rights exception applies when the seller's performance involves
some act collateral to the conveyance of title, with the result that those obligations
survive the deed and are not extinguished by it... Collateral terms may take
various forms. For example, the supreme court found collateral terms to exist in
Stubbs, where the earnest money and exchange agreement required the seller to
remove certain equipment from the property at issue. The court held that the
agreed-upon removal was collateral to the conveyance and hence that it survived
the delivery of the deed."
Dan and Carol Smith warranted that they would remedy any known building code
violations prior to closing. Plaintiff relied upon this representation that all known
building violations would be repaired before closing. This warranty is collateral to the
conveyance, as in Embassy Group, and hence it survives the delivery of the deed.
Therefore, Mrs. Moore's claim of negligent misrepresentation falls under the collateral
rights exception to the doctrine of merger. Based upon the forgoing arguments, Mrs.
Moore's claim for negligent misrepresentation should not have been dismissed by
summary judgment and this court should reverse the trial court's order.
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VTII. THE TRIAL COURT, IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE
MAJORITY RULE, SHOULD HAVE AWARDED A REASONABLE
FEE FOR PLAINTIFF'S EXPERTS TIME SPENT IN PREPARING
FOR DEPOSITIONS
On June 18, 2003 Plaintiff filed their Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff s
Motion to Award Expert Witness Fees, Tender Into Court, and Conditional Request for
Oral Hearing. (R. 1027). In this memorandum Plaintiff argued that she should be
compensated for her experts' time in preparing for the depositions that Defendants had
noticed up. Oral arguments were heard on this motion. (R. Transcript Motions Hearing
July 21, 2003 pg. 0056-0059). In the trial court's Order on Motion to Compel Expert
Fees the Plaintiffs motion was denied. (R. 1263). Legal conclusions of the trial court
are accorded no deference, but are reviewed instead for correctness. Pratt v. Mitchell
HollowIrr. Co,, 813 P.2d 1169, 1171(Utah 1991).
A.

This Court Should Adopt the Majority Rule and Compensate Plaintiff
for Her Experts' Time in Preparing for Depositions.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "the court shall require that the
party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery." U.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i) emphasis added. This is an issue of first impression
as Utah courts have not ruled on whether "time spent responding to discovery" includes
time spent in preparing for deposition. However, with regards to fees paid to an expert
witness, the provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(i), is
identical to that of Utah. Therefore, federal court decisions provide persuasive authority
to define the scope of "time spent responding to discovery."
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Although there is division among the federal courts, the clear majority of federal
courts have held that expert preparation time is compensable. 5 One court recently
affirmed what the majority rule is:
With respect to time spent by experts preparing for deposition, courts are divided
as to whether such time is compensable. Most courts have held in the affirmative.
(Citations omitted). Other courts have refused to award compensation for
preparation time, at least in the absence of compelling circumstances, such as
where the litigation is particularly complex and/or the expert must review
voluminous records.
Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) emphasis
added. As noted by the Magee court, even those courts that refuse to award
compensation for preparation time make exceptions to that rule.
U.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i) permits recovery for "time spent in responding to
discovery". "Time spent preparing for a deposition is, literally speaking, time spent in
responding to discovery." And because depositions are the only type of discovery under
Rule 26(b)(4) "it would have been relatively easy for the Rule's drafters to limit recovery
to the time actually spent appearing for the deposition if that was what they had intended
to do." Collins at 357. Although the drafters did not make their intentions perfectly
clear, a policy that allows an expert to be compensated by the opposing party for his
reasonable preparation time for a deposition could actually lower the overall costs of the
opposing party. An expert's time spent reviewing documents and reports will actually
5

See, e.g., Boos v. Prison Health Servs., 212 F.R.D. 578 (D. Kan. 2002); Collins v. Vill.
OfWoodridge, 197 F.R.D. 354 (N.D. 111. 1999); McNerney v. Archer Daniels Midland
Co., 164 F.R.D. 584 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); McHale v. Westcott, 893 F. Supp. 143 (N.D.N.Y.
1995); Hose v. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co., 154 F.R.D. 222 (S.D. Iowa 1994); Hurst v.
United States, 123 F.R.D. 319 (D.S.D. 1988); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain
Indus., 553 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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speed up the deposition process; the more costly alternative would be for the expert to
refresh his memory during the deposition while the deposing party is paying not only for
the expert's time but also the costs of counsel. Hose at 228. Additionally, the purpose of
expert witness compensation under Rule 26(b)(4)(C) is to prevent a deposing party from
benefiting from the other party's expert at the expense of the other party. Magee at 645.
By adopting the majority rule this Court would promote a policy with greater economical
efficiency and which is closer in harmony with the purpose of the statute. Plaintiff
respectfully requests that this Honorable Court follow the majority rule rationale and
"permit an expert to be compensated by the opposing party for the time reasonably
necessary to refresh the expert's memory regarding the material reviewed and the
opinions reached." Collins at 358.
B.

In the Alternative, Plaintiff Should Recover Her Experts9 Fee in
Preparing for Depositions Based on Exceptions to the Minority Rule.

The rationale behind the minority rule is that "one party need not pay for the
other's trial preparation." Rhee v. Witco, 126 F.R.D. 45, 47 (N.D. 111. 1989). In Rhee the
plaintiff requested the experts preparation time for not only "review of his conclusions
and their basis, but also consultation between the responding party's counsel and the
expert to prepare the expert to best support the responding party's case and to anticipate
questions from seeking party's counsel." Id, However, that is not the case here. None of
the time billed by Marry Moore's experts included conference time between the experts
and her counsel. (R. 1175). After considering the rationale in Rhee, the court in Hose
held that "much if not all of the rationale underlying the decision in Rhee [was] absent"
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because the compensation sought there was not for any time spent in conference between
expert and counsel. Hose at 228. Accordingly, this Court should likewise ignore the
minority rule rationale as it does not apply in this case.
Even Rhee recognized that compensation of an expert's time in preparing for
discovery may be appropriate in complex cases where a long period has elapsed from the
time of the experts report to the time of depositions and when the expert must review
voluminous documents. Rhee at 47. In the alternative, if this Court chooses to not adopt
the majority rule, Plaintiff should still recover her costs under the exceptions of the
minority rule. The expert reports were very complex and voluminous, dealing with 42
code violations and 292 pages of expert reports and 29 sections of the Uniform Building
Code and other relevant codes. Furthermore, each expert performed their inspections and
completed their report more than one full year before their depositions were taken. (R.
1175). Thus, it was necessary for them to review those voluminous reports and Plaintiff
is entitled to those costs.

IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF
COULD NOT RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON ALL
HER CAUSES OF ACTION
Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we
review for correctness. Chase v. Scott, 38 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Utah App. 2001). Mrs.
Moore is entitled to her attorney fees in this case pursuant to Paragraph "N" of the
EMSA. Paragraph "N" states in the pertinent part:
Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or
agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue
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from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy
provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by
filing suit or otherwise.
(See Appellants' Addendum No. 7) (emphasis added). The Defendants are the defaulting
party. At trial on this matter the jury found Defendants in breach of Paragraph C(a) of
the EMSA (See Appellants' Addendum No. 10). A finding that a party materially
breached an agreement "is tantamount to a holding that they defaulted in the agreement".
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah, 1998).
Plaintiff filed a Verified Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements and Attorney Fees
in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for an Order Awarding Attorney Fee's, Expenses and
Costs on April 4, 2005. (R. 2148). This verified memorandum contained, pursuant to
U.R.C.P. Rule 73(b), the basis for the award, a detailed description of the time spent and
work performed for each item of work, the position of the person performing the work,
that persons hourly rate and factors showing the reasonableness of the fee. Defendants
claimed that Plaintiffs request for fees were excessive because Plaintiff "failed to
designate the fees attributable to unsuccessful claims as opposed to successful claims".
(R. 2188). At a hearing on this issue the trial judge ruled that Plaintiff was only entitled
to attorney's fees and costs on their breach of contract cause of action. (R. Transcript
Hearing on Motions June 6, 2005 pg. 0045, 0066). Therefore, the trial court mandated
that Plaintiff resubmit their billings and eliminate any fees or costs that did not associate
with pursuing Plaintiffs breach of contract claim that she was successful on. (R.
Transcript Hearing on Motions June 6, 2005 pg. 0071).
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The trial court erred in limiting Plaintiff to her attorney's fees and costs for solely
her breach of contract cause of action. Plaintiffs claim for attorney fees and costs is
based upon Paragraph "N". Paragraph "N" does not require there to be a successful or
prevailing party in order for attorney's fees to be awarded. Paragraph "N" solely
requires that that the defaulting party shall pay all costs, expenses and reasonable
attorney's fee. The contract does not require any evaluation of the parties' respective
success in an action. Paragraph "N" permits Plaintiff to pursue any remedy available
under applicable law. Plaintiff could pursue any remedy under applicable law and still
get her fees, not just a breach of contract remedy. Therefore, pursuant to Paragraph "N",
Plaintiff was not required to prevail on all her causes of action to receive all of her
attorney's fees and costs, Plaintiff merely had to show that the Defendants were the
defaulting party and the contract provided that they shall pay all costs, expenses and
reasonable attorney's fee.
The cases in Utah that require this designation of fees based upon successful
claims and unsuccessful claims usually deal with attorney's fees clause that
provides for the "successful party" to be awarded their fees. See Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998) (holding that attorney's fees must be separated into
successful and unsuccessful claims but was interpreting a contract that relied upon the
prevailing party standard). Plaintiff should not be required to designate her fees based
upon successful and unsuccessful claims when the "successful party" requirement in not
found in the contract, such as here. Just because Plaintiffs basis for recovery was found
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in a contract, does not necessarily mean that she could only recover for breach of that
contract. If the contract provides for recovery of all fees whether or not the fees were
incurred on a breach of contract action, then fees should be awarded for all actions, not
just the breach of contract action. The language of the contract should govern what fees
and costs are recoverable.
A.

Plaintiff Eliminated all Attorney's Fees that did not Relate to the
Breach of Contract Cause of Action.

Even if Plaintiff should have been required to designate the fees and costs based
upon the successful claims and unsuccessful claims, Plaintiff met this requirement.
Plaintiff resubmitted her request for fees and costs pursuant to the trial courts mandate.
(R. 2308). Plaintiff removed every single fee that could be determined to not associate
with Plaintiffs pursuit of her breach of contract cause of action. (R. 2308). In the
prosecution and defense of Mrs. Moore's case the causes of action were so closely related
and intertwined as to be indistinguishable. "Where the proof of a compensable claim and
otherwise non-compensable claim are closely related and require proof of the same facts,
a successful party is entitled to recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related
facts." Kurth v. Wiarda, 991 P.2d 113, 116 (Utah App. 1999).
It would be impossible for Plaintiff to separate the time spent on the breach of
contract claim compared to the Fraudulent Misrepresentation claim in the first two
motions for summary judgment and discovery etc. Utah law holds that a Defendant who
had successfully defended against a breach of contract claim, in connection with which
costs and attorney fees were recoverable, was entitled to recover costs relating to factual

50

development which, while necessary to defeat contract claim, also bore on negligent and
fraudulent misrepresentation counterclaims on which defendant prevailed, even though
costs incurred in connection with those claims were not by themselves recoverable.
Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1999). The work and
research done on fraudulent nondisclosure at the beginning of the case was vital to
proving the breach of contract claim as well. For example, research done on the
reasonableness of not getting a home inspection for purposes of the doctrine of caveat
emptor as it related to fraudulent nondisclosure also was vital to the reasonableness of
when Mrs. Moore should have discovered the defects for purposes of the discovery rule
on her breach of contract cause of action. Every cause of action claimed by the Plaintiff
stemmed from the exact same factual scenario, namely, that the Defendants built the
house with many defects in it; that defendants knew or should have known of these
defects; and that they did not inform Mrs. Moore of the defects in the home or repair the
defects as they warranted in the EMS A. In-fact, Plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation
and fraudulent misrepresentation causes of action were based upon the exact same clause
in the contract as Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action. The facts and law were so
intermingled that it would be impossible to separate.
Lastly, the trial court ruled that Plaintiff could recover attorney's fees for only that
portion of the breach of contract claim they were successful on. (R. 2401-2402). This
meant that Plaintiff could only recover her fees on the improper grading or footings
defect. This is illogical. First, Plaintiff prevailed on her fraudulent nondisclosure claim
and the court held that she could not recover her fees as to that cause of action. Second,
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Plaintiff never did research on any particular defect in the home. Plaintiff never incurred
fees that related to any specific defect in the home. In-fact, the footing defect was the
single most vital and damaging of all the defects. If this had been the only defect from
the beginning it would not have altered the way Plaintiff proceeded with this case in any
way. The dismissal of the other defects did not affect how the case was prosecuted; it
only affected the final judgment obtained. Thus, the trial court erred in interpreting
Paragraph "N" to hold that Plaintiff could only recover her attorney's fees on the footings
defect part of her breach of contract claim. Plaintiff respectfully request that she be
awarded all of her attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Paragraph "N" of the EMS A.
B.

Plaintiff is Entitled to all her Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeah

A party who is entitled to attorney's fees below is entitled to attorney's fees
reasonably incurred on appeal. Valcarce at 319. Plaintiff is entitled to all her fees, costs
and expenses on appeal pursuant to Paragraph "N" of the EMS A. Furthermore, Plaintiff
is entitled to all her costs on appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 34.
Further, Defendants claim that they "would be entitled to recover their attorney's
fees and costs" should this Court reverse the trial court is patently incorrect. See
Defendants Brief pg. 36. Defendants have failed to realize that Paragraph "N" of the
EMS A does not provide for the prevailing party to recover attorney's fees but provides
that the defaulting party shall pay all costs, expenses and attorney's fees. Defendants
have never claimed that Plaintiff defaulted in any portion of the contract; therefore
Defendants could never recover their attorney's fees from Plaintiff.
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X.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT SUPPORT
ITS REDUCTION IN ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

In the alternative, if the trial court did not err in interpreting Paragraph "N" of the
EMS A, the trial court erred in arbitrarily reducing Plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs
without support in its Findings of Fact. To prevail on a claim that the trial court abused
its discretion in reducing Plaintiffs award of attorney's fees and costs, Plaintiff must
marshal the evidence to support the trial court's findings. Stout v. Creekside East
Condominium Homeowners Ass 'n, 2005 WL 2234845 (Utah App. 2005).
Ao

Marshaling the Evidence.

Plaintiffs alleged six separate causes of action in their complaint including,
Breach of Contract, Fraudulent Nondisclosure, Negligent Misrepresentation, Fraudulent
Misrepresentation, Violation of the Consumer sales Practices Act as well as Punitive
damages and Rescission. (R. 01). Ultimately, Plaintiff only came to trial on her Breach
of Contract and Fraudulent Nondisclosure causes of action because all other causes of
action were dismissed in summary judgment. (R. 2400). Plaintiff originally claimed 42
code violations in the home and Plaintiff only recovered pursuant to the finished grating
or footings defect. (R. 2401). The Defendants filed objections to Plaintiffs request for
fees arguing that Plaintiff should not be able to recover all her fees because most of her
causes of actions and defects were dismissed by this court. (R. 2236). The court ordered
Plaintiff to resubmit her request for fees and costs and remove any fee or costs that did
not associate with her pursuit of her breach of contract claim. (R. Transcript Hearing on
Motions June 6, 2005 pg. 0071). Plaintiff resubmitted her request and only reduced the
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amount requested in attorney's fees by $3,822.24. (R. 2402). The trial court found that
Plaintiff failed to provide any factual basis upon which the Court can determine the
reasonableness of her fees and costs. (R. 2402). The trial court found that "substantial
portion of the motions in the case especially the various motions for summary judgment
involved causes of action other than the breach of contract cause of action. (R. 2403).
The trial court found that there "were substantial unnecessary attorney's fees generated in
Motions to Reconsider and in disputes over the language in proposed orders and
unnecessary discovery disputes." (R. 2403). Furthermore, the trial court found "with
respect to the reasonableness of the requested fee is that the $120,000 plus requested
attorney's fee is more than four times the monetary award given the Plaintiff by the jury
and is substantially more than the $83,000.00 total purchase price for the subject home."
(R. 2403). The court found that a reasonable attorney fee was $40,000.00 and costs in the
amount of $10,000.00. (R. 2404).
Based on the forgoing evidence, it could be argued that the trial court has
abundant evidence to support its reduction of attorney's fees and costs. The trial court
ruled that many of Plaintiffs motions were unnecessary and that many did not relate to
the breach of contract cause of action. "The appellate court reviews such determinations
for abuse of discretion, granting considerable deference to the trial court due to its
familiarity with the facts and the evidence." Wiley v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah
1997). Defendants could argue that based upon the deference given to the trial court for
its familiarity with the facts this Court should not overturn the trial court's ruling on fees
and costs. Further, the argument could be made that the trial court should not be
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responsible to go through all of Plaintiff s attorney bills and deduct the ones that did
relate to breach of contract. Therefore, Defendants again could argue that the trial court
acted appropriately in its discretion to reduce Plaintiffs fees and costs as to what it
thought was reasonable.
B.

The Trial Court Reduced Plaintiffs Fees and Costs without Relying on
a Factual Basis.

As shown above, a basis to reduce Plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs possibly
existed based on the trial courts interpretation of Paragraph "N". However, Plaintiff
asserts that the trial court reduced Plaintiffs fees and costs without relying on the factual
evidence in its Findings of Fact.
Even if the Plaintiff should have been required to separate her fees into those that
were incurred on her prevailing causes, the trial court specifically found that it was
"difficult to differentiate between what legal services were necessary for the prosecution
of the subject of breach of contract claim and the Plaintiffs other causes of action.9' (R.
2403). Furthermore, Plaintiffs counsel submitted a verified memorandum that met the
requirements of U.R.C.P. Rule 73(b). (R. 2148). Defendants never once objected to a
single specific fee claiming that it was not incurred in relation to Plaintiffs breach of
contract claim. (R. 2232; 2378; Transcript Hearing on Motions June 6, 2005 pg. 0060).
The trial court pointed out that defendant did not object to the billing rate used and
therefore found it reasonable. (R. 2402). Therefore, if Plaintiff presented facts
supporting the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees and Defendants failed to
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submit evidence in opposition to that then Plaintiffs facts regarding reasonableness
should be accepted. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893-894 (Utah 1996).
The court stated that many of the motions for summary judgment that Defendants
filed dealt with causes of action other than the breach of contract. This is true. Of
Defendants six (6) motions for summary judgment, one motion dealt directly with the
breach of contract claim (R. 1377), two motions had the breach of contract claim as one
of Defendants main arguments (R. 30; 802) and the remaining three motions did not deal
with breach of contract at all. (R. 1353; 1360; 1369). Following the trial court's Order,
Plaintiff removed the fees incurred on the latter three motions from the amount requested.
(R. 2308). On the two motions that dealt with breach of contract and other causes of
action, it was impossible for Plaintiff to distinguish what fees were incurred solely for the
breach of contract part on drafting the memoranda in opposition, as well as researching
and the time spent at hearings. This is because the issues were so intertwined that
Plaintiffs counsel could not specifically allocate on his bill what part of his time he spent
drafting on fraudulent nondisclosure compared to what part of his time he drafted on
breach of contract or what part of his time he spent at oral argument on the breach of
contract issue. Furthermore, there is no law in Utah that would require Plaintiffs counsel
to be so specific on time spent in drafting a motion in opposition to summary judgment.
Both of these motions took place in 2001 and 2003 and Plaintiff substantially prevailed
on both. The trial court did not indicate any other work done or fees requested by the
Plaintiff that did not relate to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim.

56

The trial court did state that Plaintiffs Motions to Reconsider, disputes over the
language in proposed orders and discovery disputes were unnecessary. (R. 2403).
Again, Plaintiff removed all fees incurred in researching and drafting her Motions to
Reconsider from the amount of fees requested. (R. 2328-2329). Although Plaintiff
disagrees with the trial court's statement that these items were unnecessary, Plaintiff
admits that these other items were not removed from the amount Plaintiff finally
requested. Even if the trial court deducted the amount for every single motion, objection
to order and discovery dispute that it held was unnecessary or did not relate to the breach
of contract cause of action, Plaintiffs amount of attorney's fees in this case would still
easily exceed $100,000.00. If fact, if you added all of Plaintiff s attorney's fees that she
incurred after May 1, 2004 it still totals more than $41,000.00 in fees alone. (R. 2308).
April 26, 2004 is the date the judge entered his Memorandum Decision and Ruling on
Defendants five Motions and Plaintiffs two Motions to Reconsider. (R. 1710,1716). All
the motions for summary judgments, motions for reconsiderations, discovery, discovery
disputes and disputes over orders had already taken place. Everything that the trial court
alluded to in its findings of fact took place before May 1, 2004. Everything after May 1,
2004 dealt directly with Plaintiffs breach of contract claim. Surely, a great deal the work
that Plaintiffs counsel did in drafting the complaint, briefing and arguing the first motion
for summary judgment, conducting discovery, attending depositions, briefing and arguing
a second summary judgment and many more of the items related to Plaintiffs breach of
contract claim. Even after eliminating every single fee from August 11, 2000 to May 1,
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2004 Mary Moores total attorney's fees still exceed the amount the judge awarded. This
is inexcusable.
There is no evidence or basis in the findings of fact to support a reduction in
attorney's fees from $123,639.64 to $40,000.00. (R. 2400). "The trial court in exercising
its discretion must make the findings of fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions."
Willey at 230. The trial court did not find any fact that would support his reduction of
attorney's fees to the exact amount of $40,000.00. It appears that this was an arbitrary
number that was chosen out of thin air. Even if every finding in the trial court's
Memorandum Decision was supported by the evidence, there still would not be a
justification for such an immense reduction in attorney's fees requested. The same
argument applies in the reduction of costs from $35,288.08 to $10,000.00. Therefore,
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to award Plaintiff all her attorney's fees and
costs that she requested as they are reasonable as evidenced by Plaintiff Verified
Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements and Attorney Fees in Support of Plaintiff s
Motion for An Order Awarding Attorney Fee's Expenses and Costs. (R. 2148).
XI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING U.R.C.P. RULE 54(d)
STANDARDS TO THE MEANING OF COSTS

Paragraph "N" states that all costs and expenses shall be paid by the defaulting
party. The trial court stated that "Plaintiff is entitled to recover those normal costs
awarded to a prevailing party pursuant to Rule 54 and any other costs or expenses
associated with the breach of contract claim." (R. 2404). The trial court further stated
that "Recoverable costs are usually associated with things such as filing fees, witness
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fees, deposition expenses, if the depositions are used at the time of trial, and similar type
fees." (R. 2403). Because Paragraph "N" provided for all costs and expenses, the trial
court erred in limiting the meaning of costs to fit within the confines of Rule 54.
When a contract provides for the award of costs, the contract should be interpreted
to include those costs that were associated with litigation costs awarded pursuant to
interpretation of U.R.C.P. Rule 54(d), in order to not render the contract provision
superfluous. Chase v. Scott, 38 P.3d 1001, 106 (Utah App. 2001). Therefore, the term
costs under a contract include any cost that is necessary to the litigation. "[T]here may be
expenses associated with litigation that are necessary, but which nonetheless are not
properly taxable as [statutory or rule-based] costs. Again, in order to give effect to the
term 'costs' in the Contract, we hold that 'costs' should not be limited by case law
interpreting Rule 54(d)1' Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiffs' contract not only provides for
"costs" but also further provides for "expenses". Since the term costs in a contract is
broader than costs defined under Rule 54(d), then certainly "expenses" would include
every item that Plaintiffs listed as costs and expenses.
The trial court made no findings to support the reduction of costs, instead it
arbitrarily reduced it to $10,000.00. (R. 2400). Accordingly, the trial court must have
relied on an interpretation of costs pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(d) in reducing Plaintiffs
requested costs from $35,288.08 to $10,000.00. Therefore, the trial court erred in
reducing those costs and Plaintiff should be awarded all her expenses and costs pursuant
to Paragraph "N" of the EMS A.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendants' claims on appeal
and additionally reverse the trial court's Orders (1) dismissing Plaintiffs Negligent
Misrepresentation claim entered on August 16, 2001 (R. 152); (2) denying Plaintiffs
request for expert fees entered on August 20, 2003 (R. 1263); (3) dismissing 37 of the 42
original defects relating to Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure claim entered on October
1, 2003 (R. 1293); (4) Dismissing 41 of the 42 original defects relating to Plaintiffs
Breach of Contract claim entered on June 23, 2004 (R. 1749); and (5) partially granting
Plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs entered on August 25, 2005. (R. 2411).
Further, Mrs. Moore requests this Court to Order a reinstatement of (1) her
negligent misrepresentation cause of action; (2) her 37 and 41 defects respectively under
her fraudulent nondisclosure and breach of contract claims; (3) her expert fees incurred in
preparing for Defendants' discovery and (4) all of her reasonable attorney fees, costs and
expenses incurred before the trial court including those for defending and prosecuting this
appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / d a y of July 2006.

Paul D. Dodd
Counsel for Appellee
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ADDENDUM NO. 1

merger doctrine.
2
MR. HASLAM:
Well, and apparently it was.
But
3
the only basis that was brought before the court of
4
appeals, Your Honor, was the appellant's argument that
5
negligent misrepresentation falls within the fraud in the
6
exception rule.
And that was the only basis they
7
presented to the court of appeals and that is why the
8
court of appeals said our analysis will focus specifically
9
on that exception because that's what appellant asks us to
10
do.
11
THE JUDGE:
But they draw this conclusion that,
12
that this claim cannot survive the merger doctrine.
13
MR. HASLAM:
Well, that's what the trial court
14
held, Your Honor, the trial court held that.
15
THE JUDGE:
And the appellate courts upheld it.
16
MR. HASLAM:
They upheld it because, well the,
17
the court of appeals is —
18
THE JUDGE:
I mean, for whatever reason.
19
MR. HASLAM:
Sure.
Well, Your Honor, though
20
my, my opinion is that they upheld it because they
21
asserted that negligent misrepresentation fell within the
22
fraud—
23
THE JUDGE:
Well, so what?
24
MR. HASLAM: -- and it doesn't.
25
THE JUDGE:
Aren't they, aren't they... We
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER
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don't disagree it's not fraud. We disagree that it's not,
2
we don't disagree that it is not fraud.
3
MR. HASLAM:
Right. They affirm the trial
4
court—
5
THE JUDGE:
We disagree that it's not, we don't
6
disagree that it is not fraud.
7
MR. HASLAM:
Right.
They affirmed the trial
8
court—
9
THE JUDGE:
We all agree that negligent
10
misrepresentation is not fraud.
But regardless it's
11
applied, that case applies it in a contract case and
12
they're saying it doesn't, it doesn't survive a merger
13
doctrine.
14
MR. HASLAM:
I disagree, Your Honor, I think
15
it —
16
THE JUDGE:
Why do they apply it then?
17
MR. HASLAM:
Well, because that's apparently
18
what was applied for the trial court. Now the appellate
19
court, their only job was to review what the trial court
20
has done in light of the errs being asserted by the
21
appellant.
22
THE JUDGE:
Well, don't they have to say that's
23
an err?
24
MR. HASLAM: No, not if it's —
25
THE JUDGE:
They're, they're saying it doesn't
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER
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DEPUTY!

A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ. (#889)
NATHAN K. FISHER, ESQ. (#7522)
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C.
192 East 200 North Suite 203
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 652-8000
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO COMPEL AND
ON DEFENDANTS5 MOTION
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
AND TO BIFURCATE

DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
Defendants.

Case No. 000700142 MI
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendants' Motion for Sanctions or In the Alternative to Compel Discovery and the
Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Bifurcate came regularly before the
Court for decision and a hearing was held on Thursday, February 6, 2003, at which Plaintiffs
were represented by Gregory B. Hadley and Defendants were represented by Nathan K. Fisher.
The Court having fully reviewed the record, including the parties' memoranda, and having heard
oral argument, and being fully advised in the premises,
c^92

HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that
1

Defendants shall deliver to the Plaintiffs on or before Friday, February 14, 2003,
responses to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production
of Documents which relate to Defendants' financial information and documents
Defendants are not required to respond to discovery which seeks financial
information which is not available for attachment or execution such as retirement
accounts

2

The financial information and documents provided in response to the Plaintiffs'
Second Set of Interrogatones and Requests for Production of Documents shall be
delivered directly to Mr Hadley and shall not be seen, shown to, shared with, or
disclosed to anyone, including the Plaintiffs Mr Hadley is ordered to maintain
the financial information and documents received from the Defendants in
response to the interrogatones and document requests and obtained during
deposition m the stnctest confidence and to not disclose any part of it to anyone,
including the Plaintiffs, and to not permit the information and documents to be
seen by anyone until further oidci of this Court Any information concerning the
Defendants' financial information and documents discovered dunng deposition
shall also be protected as set forth herein If any inquiry is made into the
Defendants' financial information or documents during the Defendants'
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depositions, all persons shall be excluded from the room during such inquiry
Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court Reporter, along with any person approved by
Defendants, may remain m the room dunng the inquiry A transcript of the
Defendants' depositions shall not be shown to any person, including the Plaintiffs,
without first redacting all references to Defendants' financial information and
documents The financial information and documents contained m the
Defendants' depositions shall not be disclosed to any person, including the
Plaintiffs, until further order of the Court
3.

On or before February 28, 2003, Defendants shall take the deposition of those of
Plaintiffs' experts Defendants' desire to depose In the event that a problem arises
such that the experts' depositions, which are currently scheduled for February 18,
19 and 20, 2003, cannot be completed, Defendants may request a continuance of
the February 28, 2003, deadline

4.

Plaintiffs shall properly and completely respond to Defendants' Second Set of
Requests for Admission dated October 7, 2002, as follows Plaintiffs shall
respond to Requests 1 through 4 individually, and respond to Requests 5 through
9 with respect to each of the 42 alleged defects identified in the report piovided by
Rex Radford and Lloyd Steenbhk Plaintiffs are not required to respond to
Request No 10 with respect to each of the 42 alleged defects In responding to
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the Requests for Admission, Plaintiffs shall comply with rule 36(a)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure
5

Plaintiffs shall deliver to Defendants on or before Friday, February 14, 2003, the
Plaintiffs' responses to the Defendants' Second Set of Requests for Admission
dated October 7, 2002, ordered in the preceding paragraph

6.

With respect to Jason Bullock and Stephen Hatch, Plaintiffs shall deliver to
Defendants on or before Friday, February 14, 2003, a complete response to
Subsection i to Interrogatory No 1 m Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories to
Plaintiffs, which pertains to pnc testimony The response shall be limited to the
preceding four years

7

The definition of "home inspector" is a person qualified, by training or by
expenence, to perform home inspections

8

The definition of "without destructive testing" is an inspection that does not result
in physical damage to the structuie

9.

The definition of "latent" is hidden

DATED this J^Tday of February, 2003

JUDGE DONALD J EYRE/
DISTRICT COURT JUDG3

/
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NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY
TO. Gregory B. Hadley
You will please take notice that the Attorneys for Defendants, will submit the above and
foregoing Order to the Honorable Donald J Eyie, for his signature, upon the expiration of five
(5) days from the date of this Notice, which is hand-delivered to.
Gregory B. Hadley
Hadley & Associates
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 260
Provo,UT 84604
DATED this ,~

day of February, 2003
/
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4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

of these admissions.
They'd sent other requests for
admissions, other discovery. But no definitions in this
other than one little definition of what they said was
latent. And they referred to Judge Howard's decision.
Well
that's four pages. You find a definition in there that's a,
that's a clean definition of latent.
We responded but we
raised objections of vagueness, overbroad, no definitions,
you're trying to make us prove your case, you fellows do the
work on latent and patent.
We came and we argued that
motion because they said we need to do it. And Your Honor
agreed and said well, I mean, you wanted to move the case
along, I understand that, let's move this forward.
Your Honor then gives the definitions, you then give to Mary
Moore how she is to answer those given your definitions, or
why she should answer them, not how. Excuse me,
Your Honor.
One of the things you define is you defined
latent as hidden.
We're going to look at a definition of
that in a moment.
Those admissions, Your Honor, were based
on your definitions that you gave us forcing us to respond
according to your definitions.
Twenty six (26).
There is no evidence
of serious damage to the integrity of the
house.
There is no allegations the roof
leaks. There's no known damage to the
footings.
COURT PROCEEDINGS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

start curling but hey, it's not a big problem because I don't
think it will leak on you, and he starts reciting all of
these problems with the home, do you think the Moores in a
heartbeat would have bought that house? They would had said
see you later.
He didn't reveal them and he knew about
them, and that's an issue for the jury.
Latent versus patent.
Let's go back to the Ilott
case, Your Honor.
How am I doing on time? I'm on a rush,
Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:
You've got 10 minutes.
MR. HADLEY:
Okay. I won't need it.
Questions as to whether a reasonable
careful inspection would have revealed a
latent defect necessarily posed questions
of fact which should be reserved for jury
resolution.
I'm going to read that again.
Questions as to whether a reasonable
careful inspection would have revealed a
latent defect necessarily pose questions
of fact which should be reserved for jury
resolution.
That's page 1011 of the Ilott case which is a court
of appeals case barely three years old in the State of
Utah.
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And only in the clearest cases should
such questions be resolved in summary
judgment.
They go on to help us out even further,
Your Honor. They define. Now we're going to have a legal
definition. They wouldn't provide it to us, and bless you,
you gave us a definition to move this case along.
Here's
what they define, this is the Ilott case, a latent defect is,
it's defined, and they quote Black's Law Dictionary, it's on
page 1014 of the Ilott case, a defect which reasonable
careful inspection will not reveal.
Now Judge, nowhere in there is the word hidden.
That's what you defined hidden or latent as. You said
Mr. Hadley, we'll define, and you thought and I, you know,
you said it's hidden, it's in your order, it's in your order
that emanated from that hearing, it's hidden.
Well, where
in the case law, or at least in this case which is the only
one cited does that word appear? A defect which reasonable
careful inspection will not reveal.
You know, we hope we've made the fact, the point
that because of their lack of knowledge, Your Honor, they did
not realize that these defects had occurred. They didn't
have the knowledge that Mr. Smith had to we contend he should
have told him aware instead of warranting they were not aware
of any defects. Not aware of a single code violation.
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The court goes on to say about the questions of
reasonableness.
Okay.
Your Honor, they also, Black's Law
Dictionary defines a patent defect, this is interesting, a
patent defect as a defect that is apparent to a normally
observant person, especially a buyer on a reasonable
inspection.
There's an issue for a jury.
Reasonable,
there's the word again, reasonable.
Now let's go to the admissions. I alluded to this
but, Your Honor, you directed given certain definitions for
us to respond. We did respond, and we responded according to
your definition of, you know, physical, a latent is it's
hidden, it's physically hidden. No, you can look at that
attack crawl space, you can look at the windows and the
peeled paint, you can see a piece of concrete out on the
southwest corner, or you could, it's not now, there's a
little sand pile there on the southwest corner of the
house.
You can look at many of these.
And I mean, if I was there New Guiney and I walk in
to this room and you go tell me to pick up the glasses, what
are glasses.
It's the same analogy.
They said the tables
it has to do with joists. We're saying these defects you had
to have the knowledge. That's an issue for a jury.
Lastly, Your Honor, the Mitchell case. And then
I'm going to hit the statute of limitations in one minute
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the one for fees as it pertains to expert fees, that was also
noticed up.
THE JUDGE:
Well —
MR. DIXON:
We can wait on that, Your Honor.
It's, it's not urgent.
MR. HADLEY:
Well, we're here. Of course he can
wait, it's our motion.
THE JUDGE:
Well just, I can give you two minutes
to just indicate what, what you're, what you're asking for,
Mr. Hadley.
ARGUMENT BY MR. HADLEY RE: EXPERT FEES
MR. HADLEY:
Okay.
What we're asking for,
Your Honor, is, is that they pay... I'm not going to ask it
for a judgment because if you rule for us we're just going to
ask them if they sent us a check. We don't want it reduced
to a judgment.
We ask that they pay $2,363.75. That's
based on the majority viewpoint of law which frankly,
Your Honor, a little more difficult than the summary judgment
one because there is no Utah law, both sides concede that.
We cite cases to you, numerous cases along with the statute
that, that hold bearing different opinions.
They contend first, Your Honor... And by the way,
the issue here is the statute says that
a deposing party shall pay all
reasonable costs associated with the
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experts responding to the discovery. That's the
exact wording.
That's in your order in fact, your May 4th
order. I copied that exact wording when I put it in your
order.
The dispute is now this. We have contended from
the beginning that preparation time of our experts is indeed
part of responding to discovery.
We have cited to you the
majority holding and in two cases they so hold. They say in
their statement oh, this is not the majority holding.
You
read the cases, Your Honor. Even their own case that they
rely on says this is not the majority holding.
The majority
holding is that preparation time should be compensated.
THE JUDGE:
Any response?
MR. HADLEY
Well, Your Honor—
MR. DIXON:
Your Honor, this i s —
MR. HADLEY
— I'm not done. Can I-- one minute.
THE JUDGE:
You have 15 seconds.
MR. HADLEY
Fifteen seconds?
THE JUDGE:
I gave you two minutes.
MR. HADLEY
Okay.
First of all, Your Honor, the
policy, the policy behind this is, is that experts are more
prepared, if they're able to review documents they're more
prepared thus expedites the deposition, it's less costly.
And the last one is, the majority holding is is that if they
only wanted them to pay for the times they sit in the
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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They didn't say that.
ARGUMENT BY MR. DIXON
MR. DIXON:
Your Honor, I've been practicing law
for 23 years in three, three or four, five states. I've been
doing depositions, hundreds of depositions of expert
witnesses. Never, not one time has anybody ever asked for
experts preparation time before. They want 20 hours of
expert preparation time.
The majority rule is not that.
We have, we have informed the court what the majority rule
is. And I can assure you that I've had this ruled by the
discovery commissioner in the state of Nevada—
MR. HADLEY:
Your Honor, is this, is this
admissible?
Custom, his experience?
THE JUDGE:
Well you've all acknowledged,
Mr. Hadley, that there is no definite rule in Utah, there's
no case law.
And I can tell you what he's telling me,
telling the court is my understanding totally.
I've never,
I've never had anyone request preparation because the reason
being is that we'd have a dispute every time we took the
deposition of an expert.
MR. DIXON:
Right. And that's all I was going to
say, Your Honor, that was the rest of it.
THE JUDGE:
And, and so, you know, this, this
issue it's not unique. It's that the rule is, you know, and
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I might be wrong given the fact that maybe the language has
changed in this new rule, in the new version of Rule 26.
But can you, can you imagine that if, that the court having
to determine every time the deposition of an expert was taken
what was reasonable for him to prepare for this deposition.
It would, you know, it would be unwieldy and, and it would
result in what we have here, litigation over that particular
issue.
The court will award the expert's fee for the time
that he was in the deposition.
That's, that's the
standard.
MR. DIXON:
Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. HADLEY:
Are you going to review and issue a
ruling?
THE JUDGE:
Huh (questioning)?
MR. HADLEY:
Are y o u —
THE JUDGE:
That's my ruling.
MR. HADLEY:
Oh, you've ruled.
MR. DIXON:
Do you want me to prepare an order on
that one, Your Honor?
THE JUDGE:
Yes.
MR. DIXON:
Thank you.
Thank you very much for
your patience, Your Honor.
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.
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ADDENDUM NO. 4

A. BRYCE DIXON (#889)
AARON M. WAITE (#8992)
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C.
192 East 200 North, Suite 203
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435) 652-8000
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
;
Plaintiffs, ;) ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL
) EXPERT FEES
vs.
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
Defendants.

]) Civil No. 000700142 MI
)1 Judge EYRE
)
]
)

ORDER
Plaintiffs filed a document dated June 16,2003 entitled "Motion to Award Expert
Witness Fees, Tender into Court, and Conditional Request" by which Plaintiffs moved to have
Dan and Carol Smith pay for the time the Plaintiffs' four experts spent in preparing for the
depositions taken by the Smiths' counsel. That motion came on duly for hearing on July 21,
2003, the Plaintiffs represented by Gregory B. Hadley and the Smiths by A. Bryce Dixon. The
court having heard the argument of counsel and considered the written briefs therefore makes the
following ruling and order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs motion is
denied completely. The parties shall each bear the expense of their own experts' preparation for
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deposition and review of any deposition transcripts. The party who took the deposition of an
expert shall only be obligated to pay for the actual time that expert spent in deposition.
The Smiths are awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $

( )

.

DATED this^jS day of August, 2003.

IF f<

*>

\

HonorableJta4ge^on)ald Eyre\ Jr.
District Court Judge

V
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NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEYS
TO:

Gregory B.Hadley
James K. Haslam
HAPLEY & ASSOCIATES
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo,UT 84604

Yovk vri\\ pVease.takenoticetiaatti\e\indt.TS\gs\e&, Mte-mey fo* Plamtiffe, vn\\ subm^. \he
above and foregoing ORDER ON

HEARING to the Honorable Donald Eyre,

Jr., for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice.
DATED this 3 ^

day of July, 2003.
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C.

L BRYCE^rXON, ESQ.
AARtf^TM. WATTE, ESQ.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on
day of Do HI
, 2003,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing in the United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first class postage
prepaid and addressed as follows:
Gregory B. Hadley
James K. Haslam
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo,UT 84604

An Employee of Dixon, Truman & Fisher, P.C.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT A?
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

-?

1

ytffr

WILLIAM MOORE and MARY
MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 000700142 MI

DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
and CAROL SMITH, individually and as
Trustee of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos
Trust,

Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Court has reviewed the file, considered the pleadingsfiledby the parties, heard the argument of
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, issues this ruling:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, recission, fraudulent nondisclosure,
misrepresentation, violation of the Consumer Sales Practice Act, and punitive damages causes of
action. Defendants raised the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations among others.
Defendants filed a previous Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court granted the Motion as to
the claim for negligent misrepresentation and dismissed the claim. The Court denied the Motion
as to Plaintiffsfraudulentnondisclosure andfraudulentmisrepresentation claims. The Court also
ruled that the discovery rule applies in this case and tolled the statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs
were also required to elect a remedy, and the Plaintiffs elected to pursue the remedy of recession.
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Defendants filed this second Motion for Summary Judgment.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs' home, the subject matter of this litigation, is located at 155 West 300

South, Fillmore City, Millard County, State of Utah (hereinafter the "Home").
2.

Defendant Dan Smith is an experienced licensed builder, who obtained the proper

building permit and constructed the Home with the intent that it be Defendants' residence.
3.

Neither of the Plaintiffs have ever been a contractor or an engineer, nor do

Plaintiffs have any special knowledge concerning building codes, home construction, safety
inspections, etc.
4.

The Home's construction was inspected and approved by the Fillmore City

Building Inspector throughout its construction.
5.

At the time of thefinalinspection, the ground around the house was so muddy that

the finish grading was impossible. Jack Peterson, Fillmore City's Building Inspector, gave the
Smiths permission tofinishgrading in the spring when the weather cleared. Based upon the
Smiths' promise to complete the grading, Jack Peterson approved thefinalHome inspection. As
uncorrected this is a violation of the Uniform Building Code.
6.

Defendants moved in to the Home in November of 1993. Defendants received a

Certificate of OccupancyfromFillmore City Building Inspector on or about January 28, 1994.
On February 11, 1994 the Plaintiffs and Defendants met to discuss the sale of the Home, and an
Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered between the parties on or about February 15, 1994.
7.

The Agreement stated in pertinent part that:

Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1(c)
above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical condition, except:
(blank).
8.

The relevant general provisions state:
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B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is
purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by
reason of any representation made by to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling
Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income
here from or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition
subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event that Buyer
desires an additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but
arranged for and paid by Buyer.
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no
claim or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which
has not or which will not be remedied prior to closing.
9.

Plaintiffs walked through the Home before entering into the Agreement.

Defendants did not disclose any alleged code violations or defects to the Plaintiffs prior to the sell.
10.

Plaintiffs did not condition the purchase of the property on the outcome of a home

inspection, and Plaintiffs did not have an independent home inspection performed prior to
purchasing the Home.
11.

In the year 2000, Jason Bullock walked through the house as though he were

performing a final inspection and discovered the thirty (30) alleged code violations identified by
the Plaintiffs. An addition twelve (12) alleged code violations identified by the Plaintiffs were
added by Lloyd Steenblik's inspection.
13.

Plaintiffs admitted that all of the (forty two) 42 alleged defects could have been

discovered by a home inspection before they bought the house, and Plaintiffs admitted that the
only latent defects as defined by the court are alleged defect items 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, 39.
DISPUTED FACTS
1.

The home contained Uniform Building Code (UBC) violations during the

inspection period and the home was approved despite those alleged violations. The Smiths were
aware of the alleged UBC violations.
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2.

Felt paper was properly installed and served as flashing for the windows.

3.

Some floor joists are overspanned.

4.

Plaintiffs discovered or were placed on notice of many of the alleged defects long

before the home inspection in 2000.
5.

Alleged defect items 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, 39 are latent defects.
ANALYSIS AND RULING

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. When applying this rule, the Utah Supreme
Court has indicated that, when considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts and
inferences arising therefrom must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Winegar v. Froer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, the Court hereby grants
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in part and denies in part.
Fraudulent Nondiclosure
To support a claim offraudulentnondisclosure a plaintiff must show (1) the nondisclosed
information is material, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose,
and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate. Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572, 576 (Utah
2001).
In the sale of new homes, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of caveat
emptor has eroded, but in the area of used residences it is "reasonable to hold the purchaser to the
caveat emptor doctrine." See, Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah App.
1994)(quoting, Utah State Medical Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643,
645 (Utah 1982). A home inspection is not required when purchasing a new home because the
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doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply In this case, Plaintiffs did not dispute that the Smiths
lived in the Home or that the Smiths intended it to be their home in their response to Defendants'
first Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore, it is an admission The Court finds that the Home
is a used home because the Smiths intended it to be their home, they lived in the Home for a short
period of time, and Plaintiffs have admitted these facts
A duty to disclose in a vendor-vendee transaction of a used home exists only where a
defect is "not discoverable by reasonable care," and if the defect could be discovered by
reasonable care, the doctrine of caveat emptor prevails and precludes recovery by the vendee
Mitchell, 31 P 3d at 575, Maack v. Resource Design & Const, Inc., 875 P 2d 570, 579 (Utah
App 1994) The standard of reasonable care is whether the defect would be apparent to ordinary
prudent persons with like experience, not to persons with specialized knowledge in the field of
construction or real estate Mitchell, 31 P 3d at 575 The ordinary prudent person standard does
not mean that inspection by an expert will never be required There are circumstances where
"reasonably prudent buyer should be put on notice that a possible defect exists, necessitating
either further inquiry of the owner of the home, who is under a duty not to engage in fraud,
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P 2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980), or inspection by someone with sufficient
expertise to appraise the defect" Mitchell, 31 P 3d at 575
Citing facts most favorable to Plaintiffs, the nonmoving party, the alleged nondisclosed
building code defects are material, and Defendant Smiths knew of the alleged building code
violations Therefore, the Smiths were only legally obligated to disclose defects that were not
discoverable by reasonable care
Plaintiffs admitted that all of the defects items except items number 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38,
39 were patent and that they could have been discovered by a home inspection Therefore, the
doctrine of caveat emptor applies, and the Court grants the Defendants Motion for Summary
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Judgment regarding the admitted patent items because they could have reasonably been
discovered by the Plaintiffs.
Additionally, the Court finds that alleged defect item number 12, "no smoke detectors in
bedrooms and the only smoke detector in the house is a battery detector" to be an item that could
have reasonably been discovered by the Plaintiffs. Likewise, alleged defect Item number 38
"insulation baffles to allow ventilation at exterior walls" is an item that could have reasonably
been discovered by the Plaintiffs by observing there were not vents on the House in the roof area.
Therefore, the Court grants the Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to these alleged
defects and denies the Motion as to the remaining alleged defects.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
The elements of an action based on fraudulent misrepresentation are: (1) a representation,
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which the representor
either, (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge up
which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it,
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon
it, and (8) was thereby induced to act to his injury and damage. Maack, 875 p.2d at 584.
In Maack, caveat emptor was not dispositive of this issue. The Court relied on whether
the misrepresentation was concerning a presently existing material fact. Id. at 584. The Court
finds that there are disputed material facts regarding this claim and denies Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment as to this claim.
Statute of Limitations
Construction defect cases are governed by Utah Code Section 78-12-21.5, which states
that an action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within
six years of the date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. All other
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actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two yearsfromthe earlier of the date
of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have been
discovered through reasonable diligence. Also, this Court ruled in thefirstMotion for Summary
Judgment that the discovery doctrine applies in this case. The discovery doctrine tolls a cause of
action until the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts giving rise to the cause of action.
BYUv. Paulsen, 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1987). Plaintiffs assert that they were first aware of
the defects in the year 2000. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs were aware of some of the defects
shortly after moving into the home. The Courtfindsthat there are disputed material facts as to
this defense and deny Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to this issue.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court hereby grants Defendants' Motion for Summary
regarding the Plaintiffs' Fraudulent Nondisclosure claim as to defect items 1-8, 10, 12 -25, 28-38,
and 40. The Court denies the Defendants' Motion as to all remaining issues. The Court directs
counsel for the defendant to prepare an order consistent with the decision, submit it to opposing
counsel for review, and then to the Court for execution.

*2lJ

DATED this CJ

day of August, 2003.
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except for every code deviation that there could possibly
be.
In other words, the, the four provisions that we've
talked about, own examination, no representation, as is,
accept it in its present condition, all of that manifesting a
clear intention of the parties that this, this property is to
be taken subject to any potential defects, and then all of a
sudden because of the language in paragraph C, it wipes out
all of those provisions.
That's what essentially the
plaintiffs you're arguing in this case.
THE JUDGE:
So what is your position as to does
the C mean then?
MR. DIXON:
Well, our position of C is it's really
clear what it means.
It means a building violation.
If Dan Smith had been presented with what is known
by in the industry as a red tag violation, that is if Jack
Petersen the building inspector had noticed a code deviation
of some sort and he, he would have red tagged that deviation
and he would say to Mr. Smith you've got to fix this for me
to pass it off.
In fact what happened in this case,
Your Honor, is that there were, and it's undisputed, there
were no red tags.
Mr. Petersen gave a certificate of
occupancy in this case, he passed a final inspection. I can,
you know, can, you know the certificate of occupancy is in
here, it's got, it's got, it's got his signature right on it,
it's there, you know.
The certificate of occupancy, it's
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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the court's interpretation of the, of the legal aspects with
respect to contract enforcement. I don't think implied
notice is, is going to meet this particular requirement.
MR. HADLEY:
And I'm not speaking of implied.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
MR. HADLEY:
I'm speaking of actual knowledge.
THE JUDGE:
Okay. What, what evidence do you have
that he had actual notice of those defects?
MR. HADLEY:
Okay.
Well, what we have evidence
is the code itself. It says that he is held liable to follow
the law right in the code itself.
THE JUDGE:
That's, that's not going to hold with
respect to breach of contract.
It might if, if, if you
were here on a, a criminal violation of the Uniform Building
Code, a, then yes he is held to that.
But that's not what,
this is, you're trying to enforce, trying to hold him to a
breach of a contract.
And it says has received no claim nor
notice of any zoning violation or building violation.
MR. HADLEY:
Okay. We have in our prior opposing
memorandum that was filed on the issue before the court
that's in, was filed back in July, testimony by Jack Petersen
that there were discussions not only the footings but
discussions regarding the ventilation, discussions regarding
the stairs.
Now, it's true and we do not contest the fact
that Jack Petersen did indeed issue a certificate of
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occupancy. He did that.
He did that on about, oh,
January 28th or so.
A certificate of occupancy was
issued.
But, Your Honor, if we could read to you just
briefly from the code which we have cited in our memorandum.
Approval as a result of an inspection
shall not be construed to be an approval
of a violation of the provisions of this
code or of other ordinances of the
jurisdiction.
Inspections presuming to
give authority to violate or cancel the
provisions of this code or of the other
ordinances of this jurisdiction shall not
be valid.
Now, there is evidence according to Jack Petersen
in his deposition that there were violations discussed, not
necessarily every one of these, but there were violations
discussed.
Let me go on a bit with the notice.
Notice can be
as received notice of it.
Well, Jack Petersen gave him
notice, not on all claims but definitely on some.
He had
reason to know about it. That's notice.
If you had a
reason to know about it.
Again, we refute defense theory
that Jack Petersen is completely to blame for any building
code violations because he didn't catch them.
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Number 4, he knows about a related fact or is
considered as having been able to ascertain it by checking on
official filing or recording.
All of those are deemed
notice.
There is no definition in the law that says notice
has to be by a third live body as it were coming up to you
and giving you notice.
That is not notice.
Jack Petersen, or excuse me, Dan Smith has built,
Your Honor, 200 homes in Salt Lake City.
He is a licensed
general contractor up until a year or two ago, he did let it
lapse. He is still as we know a master licensed electrician
and has been for decades in this state.
He has held to
that standard.
So for them to say Jack Petersen didn't
give us notice first, that's not true because it was
discussed, he did know.
And second of all he is held to
that standard.
Another point that is made, and this is in their
memorandum that, that apparently there's no proof that none
of these defects existed at closing, Your Honor.
Well,
Your Honor, it just takes a cursory review of the 42 defects
that we have claimed to show that it would be virtually
impossible for the Moores somehow to have changed the
structure of the building to now bring about subsequent to
the sale these defects.
These defects just as a matter of
pure logic existed at the time of closing.
I didn't catch Mr. Dixon raising that in the
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guess to the jury. I guess one thing that may be considered
that if we have to go to a jury on fraudulent
misrepresentation on virtually all of the defects and then we
suddenly say but on fraudulent nondisclosure there's only
going to be five or seven that you're going to be able to
hear then somebody, and it's probably going to be Mary Moore
say well, we're going to have to clarify that to the court,
to the jury. And then we're going to have to tell the jury
well yes, it's true that those defects but the court defined
them as visible and so we admitted they're visible and
therefore you can't hear those because they're visible.
And then we have to come back and then tell them
well, same example we used before is the bottle of ink,
Your Honor, you take a man in New G u m e y and say bring him
into this room and say would you please hand me bottle of
ink, he isn't going to have the foggiest idea of what we're
talking about.
That's, that's the standard.
Do you know, there is another one, Your Honor.
There was a little surprise. And with all respect to the
court you gave the correct definition because you lifted it
out of our brief on the Mitchell case.
The Mitchell case
for the standard of reasonable care is to whether the defect
would be apparent to ordinary prudent person not just
visibility, Your Honor, it talks about the defect would be
apparent to an ordinary prudent person, I'm quoting from your
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THE JUDGE:
I know.
MR. HADLEY:
—
with like experience, not to
persons with specialized knowledge in the field of
construction or real estate.
There's no question, we've got
some specialized knowledge over here in the field of
construction and real estate.
And you don't know this yet because you haven't
read all the depositions, but Mary Moore and her husband knew
zero.
In fact in their deposition they state that's why we
bought a new home.
We didn't know how to do repairs, that's
why we bought a new house because we didn't want to mess with
doing stuff that we don't know what to do.
When I read that in your memorandum I thought well
great, he adopted what the legal, and then boy you went on to
just shoot us down based on the admissions that we made which
we did argue. But then you had a zmger, your zinger was you
said you know what, Mary Moore you admitted in that first
deposition back in, back in February of 2001, you admitted
there these facts. We didn't have a chance to respond to
that because that was in your memorandum decision. You
admitted that Dan and Carol Smith built the home for your own
residence.
You admitted that the construction was completed
on the home early in November of f 93.
And you admitted,
Mary, that the Smiths moved into the home in mid-November of
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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Those admissions, Your Honor, as set forth in that
first motion for summary judgment and our answering
memorandum was for the purpose of this motion only, it was
stated right in there.
It was because, and frankly I wasn't
directly involved but Mr. Haslam was, he felt as I agreed in
reviewing that, that they were so strong on the law we're not
going to mess right now. We hadn't even done discovery yet,
we hadn't even seen Mary's home, we hadn't seen his
financial, we hadn't seen the home he now lives in, we
didn't have all that evidence.
True, we knew he was in it a
really short time that seemed suspicious, but no, we didn't
refute those.
But we, we confined it to that motion only.
THE JUDGE:
Well, do you have any case law to the
effect.
Clearly it's either a used home or a new home and
it was not, and it been lived in.
MR. HADLEY:
Amen to that.
And boy you are right
there, Judge. Used home we got, we've got Maack, we've got
the other cases that have been cited by both, both sides that
says, you know. But there's homes, Your Honor, in both cases
that are one, two, three and four years old.
None of them
under a year old.
And indeed none of them, none of them
were ones where the, the builder of the home was the occupant
for an extremely short term and then selling it.
Bottom line is you can fashion what's used based on
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supreme court rulings.
You cannot fashion what's new
because that has not been defined. And indeed the term used
was never in one of their facts that they set forth as
undisputed.
Used was a term that you pulled out in reaching
your conclusion. Used was not something we ever admitted.
We believe that indeed that is something for the jury to
decide whether or not this home was new or used based on the
facts.
The court stated, and I again I go back to
Judge Howard in that motion for summary judgment where you
held that admission against you, will be considered by the
court until after the close of discovery, they're not going
to consider any other motions for summary judgment.
They
did state this, Judge Howard did say this.
The Smiths may have had a legal duty to
disclose to plaintiffs any latent and
material defects in the home of which
they were aware.
Further, and this is probably the most important
argument that we make based on, you know, you holding that
admission against us, and we appreciate that, and that's
Rule 56. Rule 56, by the way that was a motion for summary
judgment back in 2001, says that a judge in denying a motion,
which he did, 90% of their motion was denied at that stage,
it says,
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controversy and what material facts are
actually and in good faith
controverted.
It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy.
And, you know, nobody took Judge Howard to task for
that.
But he didn't, he didn't make any findings of fact
frankly other than to say well it's possible they had a duty
to make some disclosures here and, and I'm going to deny the
motion that pertains to those issues.
But he made no
special findings. So that is a new argument to you,
Your Honor, that's a new argument because that, that truly
surprised us.
As the court recalls, and I guess I don't need to
belabor the point, but procedurally and substantively we had
a myriad of objections to that discovery that they sent us
some three months after discovery cutoff had occurred. We
had all kinds. The most salient objection was even though
they had two or three pages of definitions they never defined
the salient term latent.
And, you know, we objected and
they filed a motion to compel and you took us to task and you
said you need to answer these. We felt it was in an effort
to move the case along, let's, you know, and I'm all for
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But the fact is then you just said what was the,
you said hidden, it's hidden or it's not visible, and I'd use
that example, hey I can see that. But if I don't know what a
bottle of ink is I've got no idea.
And that's the legal
standard.
THE JUDGE:
Well, but we defined it, we defined it
when you made those answers, didn't we?
MR. HADLEY:
That's true.
But now, now what has
occurred is we agreed, and I'm assume we're recording this,
we agree that many of those defects, building code violations
were visible, we agree with that.
But the standard is not
that they're visible, the standard is that indeed they may be
visible, but as you correctly cited in, in your memorandum,
its defect would be apparent to an ordinary prudent person
with like experience, not to persons with specialized
knowledge in the field of construction.
And that's our
whole argument on that issue.
She did not know what she was
looking at was a defect.
She could see it but she didn't
know it was a defect.
You cited the right standard but then
you ruled against us based on admissions that were not the
correct standard.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
Mr. Dixon?
MR. DIXON:
Do I need to do anything,
Your Honor?
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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St. George, Utah 84770
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
Plaintiff,
vs
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,

;
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;
]
)

ORDER FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON CONSUMER
SALES PRACTICES ACT,
FRAUD, MUTUAL MISTAKE
OF FACT AND BREACH OF
CONTRACT

Case No. 000700142 MI

Defendants.
)

1

Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendants brought Motions for Summary Judgment to dismiss Plaintiffs claim under
the Consumer Sales Practices Act, her claim for common law fraud, her claim for mutual mistake
of fact and her claim for breach of contract. Moreover, Defendant sought a Partial Summary
Judgment regarding Plaintiffs contract claims to the effect that only Paragraph "C" of the
contract gave rise to any claim for breach of contract and to have the court decide which, if any,
of the itemized list of alleged building code violations fell within the terms of Paragraph "C" of
the contract and dismiss any items outside the terms of said paragraph. Defendant argued at

CLFRK 1
DEPUTY

length that the only alleged defect that could fit within the terms of Paragraph "C" was item 27
(the matter of finish grading and the minimum frost line depth of the dirt around the house)
because Defendants admitted that the building inspector had given them permission to finish the
grading after the ground dried up in the spring. The court heard argument on these four motions
on April 1, 2004, took the matter under advisement and issued a memorandum decision dated
April 26, 2004. Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment are all granted in full with the exception
noted below.
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the breach of contract is denied as to
the issue of finish grading.
3. The finish grading issue presents an issue of fact as to whether paragraph "C" of the
contract has been breached. No other provisions of the contract are at issue under Plaintiffs
breach of contract claim. I

In

DATED this [y(

day of June, 2004

• —>*

X —
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^

j District Court JuB^DonaldY. E^re
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NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEY PURSUANT TO URCP 7
TO: Gregory B. Hadley
You will please take notice that the undersigned will submit the above and foregoing
ORDER FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT,
FRAUD, MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT to the Honorable
Donald J. Eyre, for his signature, on Tuesday, May 4, 2004
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedures 7, this proposed ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
ORDER FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT,
FRAUD, MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT ON
DEFENDANT DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos
Trust, and CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, and faxed to the following:
Gregory B. Hadley
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200
Provo, UT 84604
Fax No.: (801) 377-4411
Attorney for Defendants
DATED this 29th day of April, 2004.
UMAN, BANGERTER & FISHER, P.C.

XO'N
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND FACSIMILE
I hereby certify that I am an employee of DIXON, TRUMAN, BANGERTER & FISHER,
P.C, and that on this 29th day of April, 2004,1 placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing in
the United States mails at St. George, Utah, with 1st class postage prepaid and addressed as
follows, and that I faxed the foregoing to the following:
Gregory B. Hadley
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Fax: (801) 377-4411
An Employee of Dixon, Truman, Bangerter & Fisher, P.C.
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here in your county, or I realize some of you may not all be
from Millard County but filed here in Millard County.
Actually you are, even Delta, that's Millard County.
Thanks.
Okay.
Sorry. Hope no one is from Delta. I don't
mean to offend anyone.
Mr. and Mrs. Moore met in 1970, married, well, a
little bit before 1970, married and moved to Millard County
in 1972, '73 to begin running a farm.
They'd never owned a
home other than a little mobile home I guess I'd call it, a
manufactured home that was given to the Moores by their
parents, by Mrs. Moore's parents.
They made payments on
that paying the parents back. But that was their, that was
there sole ownership of any home.
They worked on a farm,
they worked on a farm here in this county, they did that for
almost 20 years.
One of the things that you'll find out from
Mrs. Moore is neither of them had any knowledge or ability to
fix things at least as it pertains to a home.
They didn't
know how to fix things.
In fact, you will hear Mrs. Moore
testify that her greatest Mother's Day presents is when Bill
would say what do you need fixed around here and she would
make a list and hire it done.
Let's go back to the construction of this
structure that we're talking about.
In August of 1993
Mr. and Mrs. Smith filed for an application for a building
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THE JUDGE:
You may proceed.
MR. HADLEY:
—
the document.
Also during that exchange as they are going
through and Carol Smith is filling out this earnest money
agreement, filling in the blanks as she turns it and spins it
and shows it to them and fills in as they're sitting on the
other side of the table, they come to a certain paragraph
that you will see and be given a copy of where it talks
about purchasing the home in a, in the condition that it
exists.
At that point the Moores ask of the Smiths is there
something about the house we should know about?
And the
response was from Dan Smith, it's a new house.
Upon hearing
that you will hear Mrs. Moore turned to Bill and said they're
right it's a new house.
The agreement is signed, the closing is held in May
of, of 1994, possession is surrendered, the Smiths move out
the Moores move in.
The Judge has alluded to what the causes of
action are. Breach of contract is one cause of action and
that is only relating to the footings, the footings that are,
you know, we've discussed that are underneath the foundation
and you'll maybe see some diagrams and charts, and some of
you have some construction experience so you probably know
what we're talking about.
The other cause of action is
for a fraudulent nondisclosure of indeed defects in the
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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and paid my parents back.
And that's the only move we had
until we moved up here into Utah.
Q.
Tell the jury about Bill's ability at fixing things
up, handyman work around the house?
A.
He wasn't a handyman.
He didn't do anything
around the house.
He could sweep, he could vacuum but he
couldn't fix anything.
Q.
How about you?
A.
I can't fix anything.
We changed light bulbs,
that's about it.
Q.
Were you here at the opening statement?
A.
Yes, I was.
Q.
Okay.
Did you hear me tell the jury about a
Mother's Day-A.
Yes.
Q.
—
gift that you... Just describe to the jury
that process so they can hear it from you.
A.
For Mother's Day he went out, came in and asked me
to make a list of all the things that I wanted done in the
house, and then he went out and hired a handyman to come in
and fix them.
It was things like putting things in to hang
plants on. They weren't real hard things, they were just,
but we don't do that.
And it took him three days to get all
my odds and ends done.
But that was a fantastic Mother's
Day.
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Q.
Now, when you say house are you speaking of a house
prior to the one that you're previously living in?
A.
Yes, I am.
It's the house that I lived in in
Flowell.
Q.
On the farm?
A.
On the farm.
Q.
Okay.
Now, with this intended move from Flowell
where was it exactly you, you desired to move to knowing that
you were going to move?
A.
We wanted to move to Fillmore.
Q.
And why to Fillmore?
A.
We liked the area.
Q.
Okay.
Was this a move where you would, would get
another rental unit, or tell the jury what your plan was.
A.
We never considered rental. I have animals, I love
my animals, most places don't want you to have animals if you
rent.
We never considered renting ever.
Q.
What was it you wanted to do?
A.
We wanted a new home because we just didn't want to
get into... We had, couldn't fix things up. We'd had to
hire it done, and why do it when you can buy a brand new
home.
Q.
Tell me about the... Well, how were you going to
pay for this home?
A.
We were going to pay cash for the home.
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Q.
And how were you able to have cash to pay for a
home'?
A.
We saved and saved.
It was m the bank for a
home.
Q.
If you could describe to the jury how you first
heard or came across the fact that the home that the Smiths
built was for sale9
A.
We... Somebody called us and told us it was for
sale.
Several... Well, my friends knew we were looking for
a home, that we were going to be coming up town. So any time
they'd find a home that was new they would let us know about
it
Q.
Did you know the Smiths at all prior to this
incident of kind of looking for a place and wanting to
move 9
Did you know Mr. and Mrs. Smith 9
A.
I knew them to see them in the store and say hello
to them.
Q.
Okay.
Tell the jury about your first contact with
the Smiths regarding the house that they had built 9
A,
We called them on the phone-Q.
Okay.
A.
—
and asked them if their home was for sale, that
we'd heard that it was. And they said it was for sale.
We
asked the price that they were asking, it was 85,000, and we
asked if we could see the home.
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Q.
And what was their response9
A.
Yes, we could.
Q.
Okay.
So what was the next thing to happen now 9
A.
We went up the next day and they took us through
the home.
Q.
Do you recall what the date was?
A.
The 11th of February.
Q.
And how do you, how do you know it was the 11th of
February?
A.
Because I kind of wanted to do it on my daughter's
birthday on the 20th but it was too far down on the line.
It's just a date for me, it was her birthday.
Q.
Okay.
When you arrived at the home was it, was it
you and Bill together9
A.
Yes, it was.
Q.
Okay.
And, and just tell the jury now you're, I
assume you're pulling in the driveway and just kind of start
telling the jury what happened as you now came to the house.
A.
We went into, it was about 12:30 and we went into
the driveway. And there was a two car garage and I'd never
had a house with a garage on it. This was fantastic, there
was two of them.
And went up and rang the doorbell.
They
came and, or Carol answered the door and we went in, we went
up the stairs.
The stairs were carpeted. And just walking
in the front door was beautiful. And we went through the
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livingroom and it was gorgeous, it was big.
The diningroom
was real nice size.
Q.
Let me just interrupt.
Ifm sorry.
Who was it
that was in the, the home of the Smiths when you arrived?
A.
Dan and Carol.
Q.
Was there anyone else there?
A.
No.
Q.
Okay.
And as you're kind of describing this are
you all together or are you kind of just everybody
wandering?
A.
At that point we're all together.
Q.
Okay.
Go ahead.
A.
We got into the, the kitchen part and looked at the
stove and I kind of panicked because the buttons, it's set
with buttons and you turn the timer on with a button and
press another button to put how much time you want on it and
push start to, it was just really modern and it really
impressed me but I wasn't sure I was going to get that one
down right.
But there was a lot of room.
We went down and
Carol showed us the pantry and the coat closet.
And in my
other home I had no coat closet so that was very nice.
Went
down and saw the main bathroom.
Went into the master
bedroom and that totally impressed me because it was so
large.
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Q.
Who is with you in the master bedroom when you're
there?
A.
Mr. Smith.
Q.
And who else?
A.
Bill and I. I don't remember—
Q.
What about—
A.
-- Carol being there, that part.
Q.
Okay.
All right.
Go ahead.
A.
But I commented on how big the bedroom was because
I liked, I wanted a lot of room in there.
And Dan says he
had built homes before so he knew what people liked.
And it
was gorgeous. Carol had done a beautiful job of putting
everything up.
We went into the guest room—
Q.
Excuse me. What do you mean by putting everything
up?
A.
It was to where she had her furniture there.
Q.
All right.
A.
The furniture she had it was just, it just looked
beautiful.
And we went into what I call the guest bedroom
and that would be the one on the east side of the home and it
had deep shelves on the two, that window and also the next
smaller bedroom.
And that, I've always wanted those and I
thought that was really neat.
Then we went, from there we
went downstairs a n d —
Q.
Just if you'd describe the basement as you went
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1 where it says fire inspection.
Okay?
2
A.
We asked if there was anything we needed to know
3 about the house.
4
Q.
Did, did Carol read you that phrase 1-E?
5
A.
She read the, the sentence to us.
6
Q.
Okay.
7
A.
And we said is there anything we need to know about
8 'the house.
9
Q.
Okay.
10
A.
Dan said well, it's a new house.
11
Q.
Okay.
12
A.
And we looked around and it is.
13
Q.
Okay.
Again, let's go to paragraph 2, purchase
14 price and financing.
15
A.
Okay.
16
Q.
Is it here that you because of the way the form is
17 filled m discussed about a cash-18
A.
Yes.
19
MR. DIXON:
Your Honor, the issue of how the
20 house was financed or paid for is not before this jury.
21
THE JUDGE:
What do you claim for that,
22 Mr. Hadley?
23
MR. HADLEY:
Well just, just wanting to show that
24 indeed it was understood as the document does explain.
25
THE JUDGE:
Well, the document speaks for itself.
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pictured there in #2-B.
A.
(THE WITNESS:) That's more window damage on the
side that does not open.
Q.
Okay.
And this is the same window?
A.
Yes, sir.
It is.
Q.
Okay.
All right.
And again you took the
photo?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
Okay.
All right.
Does anyone, does anyone have
#2-C?
MR. DIXON:
I have #2-C.
THE JUDGE:
Yes.
Q.
(MR. HADLEY:)
Everybody has it but me. I want
you to tell the jury what you see in #2-C.
A.
(THE WITNESS:)
#2-C is window damage that has
occurred into the spare bedroom in the windowsill.
Q.
Okay.
A.
And I took that picture.
Q.
All right.
A.
But it goes, the little holes and stuff are further
out.
Q.
Let's, let's go to the footings.
Tell the jury
when you first became aware that a, there was a problem with
the footings.
A.
When they installed my fence, chainlink fence—
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Q.
Okay.
A.
—
in my back yard in 2000 in April.
Q.
And tell the, tell the jury what happened and, and
just describe to them the story.
A.
While they were putting the gate posts in on the
east and on the west side of my home, the first one they
called my attention to was on the east side of the home.
The gentleman Bardall (phonetic) that was doing the digging
called me out and said that the footings were not deep
enough in the ground to, that he felt to call the city and
ask what the measurements should be.
So I went upstairs
and I called, and at the city building and she told me 30
inches was frostline, below frostline. So I went out and
told the boy and he says I think you should get a picture of
this.
Q.
Okay.
A.
So I got a tape measure and a camera and I went
back down, and Alan held the tape measure and I took the
picture. And then he went over to the west side of the home
and we, he dug that fence post and we took that picture
also.
Q.
Do you have #3-A and #3-B there?
A.
I do.
Q.
Okay.
You mentioned, did you say Steve?
Who did
you say was holding the tape?
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A.
Alan.
Q.
Oh, Alan. Ifm sorry.
And he's one —
A.
Bardall (phonetic).
Q.
—
of the workers.
Okay. All right.
A.
He and his father were doing the fencing.
Q.
Okay.
Just if you would describe, describe to the
jury what, what these depict then.
THE JUDGE:
Let's talk about #3-A why don't you?
A.
(THE WITNESS:)
Well, #3-B was the first one that
we discovered.
Q.
(MR. HADLEY:)
Okay.
#3-A.
A.
No. #3-B was the first hole that he called me, my
attention to.
Q.
Okay.
Let's go to #3-B.
A.
And that was on the east side of the home.
Q.
All right.
A.
And so we took a tape measure down and put it on
the footing, and he measured and said take a picture.
Q.
Okay.
A.
And at that point I did.
Q.
Okay.
Can you tell from that picture where the
footing ends?
At what, at what inch?
A,
The footing at the one inch is on the footing.
Q.
Right.
A.
And then the dirt comes up.
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Q.
That's the bottom of the footing?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Okay.
And where does the footing end, at what
inch?
A.
About 10 inches.
Q.
Okay.
And can you tell the jury the same on #3-A
what you, what you saw as this picture kind of depicts.
And
where was this hole? Let's go to #3-A.
Where was this hole
dug?
A.
#3-A is on the west side of my home.
Q.
And, and why were they digging, where was the fence
being put in?
A.
There was gates being put-Q.
Oh, okay.
A.
-- on each side of my home.
A car gate went on
the west side, on the east side and a walk through gate was
on my west side.
Q.
Okay.
And where is the bottom of that tape
resting on #3-A?
A.
The bottom would be resting on the footing.
Q.
Okay.
The bottom of the footing?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay.
And again, where do we see the top of the
footing and the inch marker?
A.
Well, the dirt is at a 10.
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0123
I look out the, you're looking south?
2
A.
Yes.
3
Q.
And just so that the jury can be refreshed on the
4 point, that's the door you walked out when you were looking
5 at the house on February 11th when you described the back
6 door?
7
A.
Yes, sir.
8
Q.
Okay.
Other than the grass that you're looking
9 at in that picture is there anything else that's different
10 from when you first saw that view out the back door in
II 1994?
12
A.
I have a dresser there, a rug on the floor, a
13 little white thing to wipe your feet on outside.
14
Q.
Okay.
15
A.
And then there's another thing that I have there
16 that I use to wipe mud off my feet, and a chair.
17
Q.
Okay.
Let's go to #4-E.
18
A.
Yes, sir.
19
Q.
Describe what #4-E depicts.
20
A.
#4-E is a picture of the back of my house from the
21 south looking towards the north towards my house.
22
Q.
Okay.
And did you take that photo?
23
A.
I did.
24
Q.
And when did you take that photo?
25
A.
I would say the same roll of film that I took
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Q.
Okay.
A.
Never a new home.
Q.
You're taking it as-is with all of the risks.
Correct?
A.
On an older home, yes.
Not a new home.
Q.
Well, did you... This particular home had an as-is
clause in it and you didn't look?
A.
That I don't know.
It wasn't shown.
Q.
That's fine.
You didn't ask for any warranties
to be inserted in that one place where it said none, did
you?
A.
We asked if there was anything we needed to know
and Mr. Smith said it's a new house.
Q.
Okay.
A.
We agreed.
Q.
And that's, and you didn't ask for any warranties
of any kind, did you?
A.
It was a new home.
No, sir.
Q.
All right.
Thank you very much, ma'am.
THE JUDGE:
Mr. Hadley, —
MR. HADLEY:
Yes.
THE JUDGE:
—
any redirect?
REDIRECT BY MR. HADLEY.
Q.
(MR. HADLEY:)
Do you have these two photographs
with the tape there Mary, #3-A and #3-B?
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0199

0445

A.
I did.
Q.
Where were you... Tell me about your discussions
with Mr. Moore. First of all, tell me about your first
discussion with Mr. Moore. Where were you when that
discussion took place?
A.
We were probably in the basement.
Q.
Okay.
A.
What we did, we met upstairs and we walked around
through the house and they were looking at the home, so
forth.
And then Mary and Carol went out in the kitchen and
sat down at the kitchen table and were visiting out there.
And Bill and I went outside, down in the basement and looked
around and then outside.
And that's when we had some
discussions.
Q.
All right.
And a, tell me about these
discussions.
A.
Well, Bill started talking about price and so forth
like that.
And a, we were on the end of the a, east end of
the house. And it was a nice sunny day about like today.
And a, we were, and the reason we were on the east because
that's the sunny side. And a, we stood there talking and one
of the conversations was about the aluminum siding. And we
were, Bill reached up there and he kind of felt it and he
said he liked that, he liked that aluminum siding on there.
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And we also while standing there Bill told me that a, one of
the first things that he was going to do was if he bought the
home would, he would level that off there.
Q.
Level what off?
A.
The dirt that we had backfilled against the
foundation.
Q.
And that —
A.
And because it sloped off to a pretty good slope
and—
Q.
On what, what side of the house are we talking
about?
A.
We're talking about the east end of the home.
Yes.
Q.
And that's where he reached up to see the siding9
A.
Yes.
Q.
Touch the siding9
A.
Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q.
And what's the significance of him reaching up to
feel the siding to you 9
A.
Well, you've got to realize we were high enough
so he could.
Otherwise, if it had been cut down he
couldn't have, wouldn't have been able to.
But he did just
mention that the aluminum siding that he liked it. We was
kind of talking about it about how a, maintenance free and so
forth and that's w h a t —
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Q.
All right.
So now tell me, tell the jury again
what, what dia he say about the dirt on that occasion just
then?
A.
Well what, what Bill said was that he wanted to use
that for a driveway through there and that one of the first
things he was going to do was remove that dirt down so that
it would be level across there.
Q.
Okay.
And he's talking about on the east side of
the house?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you have a response to that?
A.
I did.
Q.
What was your response?
A.
My response was that Bill, you can't remove the
siding, or the dirt there, and the reason you can't is
because you will expose the footings and take it down so
that you wouldn't have the, the 30 inch frostline that's
required.
Q.
Did he respond to that?
A.
Yes, he did.
Q.
What did he say?
A.
He told me, he says, you let me worry about that.
That was... I also told him at that time that you wouldn't
have to do that because you could add dirt further out and
still add. And there was, there was a pile of dirt in the
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back yard at that time.
Q.
What was the pile of the dirt in the back yard
for?
A.
That was for the finish grade. That was top
soil.
Q.
All right.
Had the house at that time had the
finish grade 9
A.
It had the rough grade.
Q.
All right.
Did it have backfill to the 30 inch
level?
A.
Right close.
Q.
Okav .
And the dirt, and the piles of dirt in the
back yard were for what purpose?
A.
Top soil for spreading out over it when you planted
lawn and so forth.
Q.
Okay.
And when did you intend to do that 9
A.
In the spring when you would plant grass or do your
landscaping.
Q.
Okay.
All right, what other conversations did
you have with Mr. Moore, if any, about the dirt situation?
A.
I think that was about it as far as the dirt was
concerned.
Q.
Okay.
And then did you then arrive at a, an
agreement to a, purchase the house?
A.
Yes.
Bill and I walked, we kept walking around
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different things. And, and Bill said to me at that time he
said a, gosh he says, you've got a commission in here, and I
said no, there's no commission in this, in the price. We
talked price prior to that.
Q.
All right.
A.
And—
Q.
All right.
When you, you had seen pictures of the
house, we've shown these pictures over and over again—
A.
Yes.
Q.
about what the house looks like now, how it's
flat on the east, level with the driveway. You've seen that
picture.
A.
Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q.
Right?
A.
Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q.
Was the house that way when you talked with
Mr. Moore on February 14th, 1994?
A.
Definitely not.
Q.
What, what did... What is the difference?
A.
That all of the dirt has been taken out underneath
the patio or the porch up above all along the back and the
east side.
Q.
All right.
Now—
A.
And—
Q.
Go ahead. Excuse me.
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Q.

And basically that's how you went through the

form.
A.
Yes. I passed it around so they could see what
they wanted to.
Q.
And so, I realize it's been a while ago, but do
you have a memory of turning it over and saying at any given
time well now this, this little phrase here has to do with,
you know, this little paragraph here? Or, or is it just more
that generally what you felt the important items were on the
boilerplate language you just brought up and discussed
together?
A.
Pretty much.
Q.
Okay. Now you said that your recollection was
February 14th when,the Moores first came to view the home?
A.
That's how I remember.
Q.
Okay.
I'm not sure the date is exactly
relevant.
But we do know on the 15th-A.
Yes.
Q.
-- the earnest money-A.
Right.
Q.
—
was signed.
You testified that a, that there
was a, there was a time when Mr. Smith said Bill, you know,
come on, I want to show you some things.
A.
Exactly.
Q.
And, and he left the house with Bill and you and
COURT PROCEEDINGS

0479

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
0480

Mary were I think you said upstairs. Is that correct?
A.
Yes, we were at the table.
Q.
Tell me just quickly, I know we're all eager to
move on, the process of when that hey Bill, come on, I've got
to show you some things, where was that in the sequence of
what happened?
A.
Well, they had already looked through the house
oh, they had already seen the house upstairs.
Q.
The upstairs.
A.
And to my recollection, now I may have gone
downstairs with them and Mary may have in the basement
because I'm sure she would have wanted to look down there so
that probably did happen.
Q.
Okay.
A.
And for some reason we were back upstairs, the four
of us were upstairs at the time.
Q.
Okay.
A.
And Dan said to Bill come on, I need to talk to you
about some things because, I mean, I could tell you what I
would assume they would have talked about but I'm sure you'd
rather just get that from Dan because, you know, he has to
tell him where the water shuts up and show him the furnace
and water heater, show him the property line and stuff.
Q.
So, so your recollection is we all go downstairs
now. Now yesterday you stayed upstairs but you seem pretty
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certain that-A.
I may have gone down. I don't know.
But I-Q.
All right.
A.
I know there was a time when Dan and Bill went down
without Mary and I.
Q.
Okay.
So I'm going to give you two scenarios
because I just-A.
Okay.
Q.
—
you know, you're a good story teller-A.
Go ahead.
Q.
—
so just tell me what happened here.
You all
four go downstairs, you look around in the basement. Mary
testified that you walked out the back door along some wood
planks because it was muddy over to-A.
I don't remember me walking out the back.
Q.
Okay.
And then everybody back upstairs because
it's, it's definitely upstairs where Dan said B i l l —
A.
Yes.
Q.
come on, I want to show you?
A.
Absolutely.
Q.
So apparently rather than just show him while they
were downstairs and going across the plank and already in the
back yard, Dan for whatever reason chose to go back upstairs
with everybody and then take Bill back down and outside a
second time?
Okay.
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A.
And I think probably—
Q.
(Short inaudible, away from mic).
A.
Okay.
Never mind.
Q.
Let's just move forward.
A.
That's fine.
Q.
Now, and I'm just going to say February 14th, I'm
not necessarily going to argue that date, but we're going to
say it was what you said on the 14th, or that's your
recollection, but prior to the signing, the day before at
least prior to the signing the earnest money which exhibit
you have, that when they first came that was the same day
that Mr. Smith I'm going to say cut the deal so to speak with
Bill for Bill to do the final grade, you know, move that
dirt, you know, and etcetera.
Correct?
A.
Correct.
Q.
Okay.
Now, it's later that day after the Moores
have left, this was the 14th, that Mr. Smith told you that
Bill had agreed to do the final grade. Is that correct?
A.
That's partially, that's part of what was said.
Q.
All right.
Please tell me the rest.
A.
Okay. I can remember that we had to discuss
because they had discussed price so Dan had to discuss the
difference of what they were going to do with price with me,
which he did. I can remember—
Q.
This was after they had left?
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a minute there's some stuff I want to show you.
Do you
recall them saying that?
A.
I recall them saying it in court, yes.
Q.
Okay.
From the moment that you walked into that
house on February 11th, 1994 until the time that you and Bill
left together in that same day were you and Bill ever
separated for so much as five seconds?
A.
I testified to that Monday.
No, we were not.
Q.
Were you always within eyesight and hearing of each
other?
A.
Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q.
Strike that.
Strike that.
I want to know how far the, the maximum length that
you two were ever separated while you were viewing the home
together that day. I want to know the furthest you were ever
apart.
A.
My arm length would be the furthest I'd have been
from him. We're together looking at a home.
And it's our
first home.
Q.
From, from February 11th, '94, that d a y —
A.
Yes.
Q.
—
until Bill passed away in 2 0 0 1 —
A.
Yes.
Q.
—
did Bill ever say to you Mary, I cut a deal
with Dan, we're doing the landscaping, we're doing the finish
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grading and we're bringing that soil right up to that
frostline level.
Did he ever once ever say anything like
that to you?
A.
Bill told me everything, we talked about
everything. No.
Q.
Did he ever say to you, you know honey, as soon as
you get that place I'm going to move around to the west, east
side of that house there that we've got and I'm going to
scrape that dirt away, I'm going to scrape all that dirt out
of there so I've got it just nice and flat so I can use it to
get access
to the back lot.
Did he ever say anything like
that?
A.
We didn't need to. We backed a big truck down
there and dumped, we dumped manure and sand back there in a
big dump truck off the farm.
Q.
Answer my question.
A.
No.
Q.
Did you ever, did you ever, Mary, from
February 11th to this date as we stand here take so much as a
teaspoon full of dirt out of that property?
A.
No, we did not, I did not.
Q.
Did Bill?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you so much as... Well, let me...
You know this big pile of dirt that, that we have
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consult one with another.
So we'll be in recess and if counsel will meet with
me in chambers.
MR. HADLEY:
Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:
What?
MR. HADLEY:
I have to ask you a question.
(Tape turned off.)
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
Will let's bring in the jury.
MR. DIXON:
Judge, are we going to make a record
of—
THE JUDGE:
Oh, let's see. Before you, yes,
before you bring in the jury.
Ifm sorry.
Thank you,
Mr. Dixon.
You may be seated.
Okay.
We'll go back on the record in the case of
Mary Moore versus Dan and Carol Smith. The Court has met
with counsel in chambers and we've reviewed the jury
instructions and the proposed verdict form.
Mr. Hadley, at this time does the plaintiff take
any exceptions to a, instructions that were offered that were
not given or to any a, that the Court is going to give that
you oppose9
MR. HADLEY:
No, Your Honor. No exceptions.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
Mr. Dixon, does defendant take
any exceptions to the, to the jury instructions that that
they, that you proposed that are not to be given and to any
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your as-is clause request the, the Court find, found that to
be argument, clearly it's argument that you can make and the
Court found it not inappropriate, not appropriate to include
as an instruction.
MR. DIXON:
The other thing I, I object to,
Your Honor, is I would like instruction number 30 statute of
limitations defense clearly imposes upon the, it clearly
defines for the jury that a, the, the statute of limitations
for any breach of contract in this type of case is a six
year statute of limitations and that there is no a,
discovery period or tolling period applied to that.
That,
and—
THE JUDGE:
Well, I gave your exact statute of
limitations instruction.
MR. DIXON:
Number 30?
THE JUDGE:
I don't know if it's, it's... Does it
started out plaintiffs claims against defendant are barred
and invalid if they do not, did not file their suit within
the applicable statute of limitations?
MR. DIXON:
Okay.
Well, then I object to the,
any jury instruction that, that they gave that tended to a,
find that there is, that a tolling or a discovery period
applicable to a contract.
That's what I object to.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
MR. DIXON:
I'm not sure what the number is
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because it doesn't have a number in here but, but that's what
I'm objecting to.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
Thank you.
Okay.
Let's bring the jury in.
Okay.
You may be seated.
The record may
reflect that the jury is now on the courtroom. I apologize
it took a little bit longer than I thought it would, but I
can tell you that we, we did work continually and diligently
since we last saw you.
The Court is going to now read the
jury instructions to you.
They are somewhat lengthy but I'd
ask that you pay close attention to them, you'll have a copy
of them with you in the, in the juryroom for you, your
deliberations.
Instruction #1.
Members of the jury, I would like
to thank you for your attention during the trial. I will now
explain to you the rules of law that you must follow and
apply in deciding this case. When I have finished you will
go to the juryroom and begin your deliberations, what we
call, begin your discussions, what we call your
deliberations.
Please pay attention to the legal instructions I'm
about to give you.
This is an extremely important part of
the trial.
You are not to single out one instruction alone as
stating the law but must consider the instructions as a
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defects in the house; and
2. Such construction defects were material; and
3. Defendants had a duty to disclose to the
plaintiffs the existence of these material construction
defects and failed to do so.
Instruction #24.
Plaintiff claims that the
defects in the house are material.
A defect is material if
it is something which a buyer or seller of ordinary
intelligence and prudence would think to be of some
importance in determining whether to buy or sell a home.
Instruction #25.
The plaintiffs had a duty to
discover the, to discover by exercise of reasonable diligence
any construction defects before they bought the house.
Plaintiffs are obliged to exercise care to discover those
construction defects which a reasonable prudent person would
ordinarily find after examination and an inspection.
Instruction #26.
In determining whether plaintiff
exercised reasonable care you may consider whether the
plaintiffs could have reasonably obtained a house inspection
before they bought the house.
If you determine the
plaintiffs have, should have obtained a house inspection and
that such a reasonable home inspection would have disclosed
to the plaintiffs the alleged construction defects then they
are not entitled to recover for fraudulent nondisclosure.
Even determining the reasonableness of the actions of the
COURT PROCEEDINGS

0553

0563

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

plaintiffs you may... In determining the reasonableness of
the actions of the plaintiffs you must consider the newness
of the home, the fact the seller was a licensed general
contractor and that the plaintiff was an unsophisticated
buyer
Instruction #27.
The plaintiff must proof by
clear and convincing evidence that as a result of the
fraudulent nondisclosure the plaintiff has suffered injury or
loss.
Instruction #28.
Damages are not recoverable for
loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be
established with reasonable certainty.
Instruction #29.
The fact that I have instructed
you concerning damages is not to be taken as an indication
that I either believe or do not believe that the plaintiff is
entitled to recover such damages.
The instructions in
reference to damages are given as a guide m case you find
that from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to
recover.
However, if you determine that there should be no
recovery then you will entirely disregard the instructions
given you upon the matter of damages.
Instruction #30.
If you decide that the defendant
is liable to the plaintiff you must decide how much money
will reasonably compensate the plaintiff for any injury or
loss proximately caused by the defendant's fraud.
In
COURT PROCEEDINGS

0564

I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
0565

awarding the plaintiff compensation you should consider the
amount needed to place the plaintiff in the same position in
which the plaintiff would have been had the defendant,
defendants made the nondisclosed representations.
Instruction #31.
Plaintiffs claims against
defendants are barred and invalid if they did not file their
suit within the applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs filed their suit on August 24th, 2000.
Utah law
provides that an action for, for construction defects based
in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years
of the date of the closing of the sale of the house.
Utah
law provides that an action for fraudulent nondisclosure
shall be commenced within two years of the time that the
plaintiffs discover their cause of action for fraudulent
nondisclosure, or the date upon which cause of action should
have been discovered through reasonable diligence.
Instruction #32.
Discovery of an injury occurs
when a plaintiff knows, knows or through the use of
reasonable diligence should know that the house has a
construction defect.
A plaintiff need not have certain
knowledge of the existence of the defect in order to have
discovered it.
All that is necessary is that the plaintiff
be aware of the facts that would lead the ordinary person
using reasonable diligence to conclude that a claim for
construction defect may exist.
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Plaintiffs are deemed to have discovered their
claim or cause of action for fraudulent nondisclosure when
they learned of facts putting them on notice of such claim
The discovery rule benefits a plaintiff by operating to toll
or extend the time period of the statute of limitations until
the discovery of the defect in the home that form the basis
for the cause of action.
If you find that plaintiff did not
know or would not have discovered the defects if she
exercised reasonable diligence, then the statute of
limitations does not bar the plaintiff's claim.
Instruction #33.
It is your duty to make findings
of fact as to questions I will submit to you.
In making
your findings of fact you should bear m mind that the burden
of proving any disputed fact rests upon the party claiming
the fact to be true, and that the fact must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence for the breach of contract
questions and clear and convincing evidence for the
fraudulent nondisclosure questions.
This is a civil action and six members of the jury
may find and return a verdict.
At least six jurors must
agree on the answer to each question but they need not be the
same six on each question.
As soon as six or more of you
have agreed on the answer to each question have the verdict
signed and dated by your foreperson and then return it to
this room.
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MR. DIXON:
Thank you, Your Honor.
CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MR. DIXON
MR. DIXON:
I don't want to repeat all the
evidence. And you've been, you know, I've never said this
before, you have been a very attentive jury, everybody has
been so attentive.
Typically speaking in cases that are
somewhat technical or there was not a crime or anything
committed, you know, there's no murder or blood or anything,
any pictures, you know, people have a little more interest.
But you've paid such close attention and I thank you very
much for your attention and for your diligence and your
willingness to serve as, as jurors.
This case is pretty simple.
The, I'll bet you can
guess the part of the contract that I'm going to mention
first, this is an as-is contract. I don't need to have to
show it to you again, you've already seen it.
The Smiths
sold a house to the Moores as-is.
They sold it with no
warranties.
They bought, the Smiths take this house as-is
all, whatever it is, whatever the house is.
What did the Moores know about this house?
We had
a lot of discussion and a lot of dispute about what was the
status of the dirt at the time of, that the house was sold
February 15th of 1994.
You know, that really can be all set
aside.
It doesn't, it's not even really necessary because
the Smiths sold it as-is.
The Moores took that house
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construction defects before they bought
the house.
Plaintiffs are obligated to
exercise care to discover these
construction defects which a reasonably
prudent person would ordinarily find
after examination and inspection.
You know, she can't just say well, I didn't do
anything. She has to act with a certain degree of
responsibility, ordinary responsibility. She has to take,
the Moores have to take responsibility for themselves. They
could have hired a lawyer, they could have had somebody look
into this thing, they could have had a home inspection done
and they didn't do it.
And it's not for them to blame us
seven, six years later and have, and take us through this
trial until 2005 because they didn't exercise the
responsibility for themselves that they should have done in
the first place.
26.
Whether the plaintiff could have
reasonably obtained a home inspection is
one of the things that you may consider
in deciding whether she acted properly.
This one I won't show but it does show that you
have to prove, there has to be damage too that's proven by
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clear and convincing evidence on the fraudulent
nondisclosure. And I submit there isn't been any damage
whatsoever.
There has to be, there has to be reasonable
certainty about damages.
There isn't any reasonable certain
here. There hasn't been any damage. There's been the
slightest little bit of damage to the windows and no damage,
ladies and gentlemen of the jury, has ever been proven to the
footings of the foundation. Not one person testified with
any degree of certainty at all about damages.
That is not
even an element of this case, and Mrs. Moore isn't even
concerned about it.
And this just says... I won't go over that one.
Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we have to
talk about the statute of limitations.
Just because we talk
about the statute of limitations doesn't mean that I assume
that there's any fraudulent nondisclosure or any breach of
contract.
It's just something that is a defense, and it's a
very proper defense. It's, the statute of limitations keeps
us from having to go back years and years and years. You
know, we're talking a long time before this case is finally
brought, and the statute of limitations in this case starts
on August 24th, 2000.
Utah law provides that an action for
construction defect based in contract or warranty shall be
commenced within six years of the date of the closing of the
sale of the home.
We know the sale of this home closed m ,
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Six years, later than six years on this contract claim. That
alone takes care of their contract claim.
Utah law provides in an action for fraudulent
nondisclosure shall be commenced within two years of the time
that plaintiffs discovered their cause of action for
fraudulent nondisclosure or the date upon which the cause of
action should have been discovered through reasonable
diligence.
Well, when should it have been discovered through
reasonable diligence?
Instruction number 32 addresses
that.
Discovery of an injury occurs when a
plaintiff knows, or with the use of
reasonable diligence should know that the
house has a construction defect.
A
plaintiff may need not have knowledge of
the existence of the defect in order to
have discovered it.
You don't have to know it exactly.
All that is necessary is the plaintiff
be aware of facts that would lead an
ordinary person using reasonable
diligence to conclude that a claim for
construction defect may exist.
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Plaintiffs are deemed to have discovered
their claim or cause of action for
fraudulent nondisclosure when they learn
of facts putting them on notice of such
claim.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, with respect to
the windows what is the undisputed evidence?
That Mary
Moore saw some water intrusion in the first winter, and it
was slight but it wasn't, it never did get very big so
that's not really consequential one way or the other.
The
first winter would have been 1995.
There's two years....
That's when she has been put, when she learned of facts
putting her on notice of such a claim. That's when she
started.
That's when she asked Jack Peterson to come look
at her windows.
And he told her that it's just
condensation on cheap aluminum windows. That's what he told
her.
And she still decides to bring this lawsuit against
us.
Thank you very much.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, they, the, if
there's any issue at all about when the plaintiffs should
have known about this breach of contract I say six years is
the time, but counsel is going to argue it's six years from
the date they discovered it.
But I say remember this. When
you look at that contract it says that the breach occurs on
COURT PROCEEDINGS

0588

0589

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

on the closing.
And if Mary Moore was, and the Moores were
concerned about that particular thing it was on the date of
the closing that the breach occurred.
That's when they
could have if they wanted to have checked it out and found
out if there were any building violations.
But you know
what, if they had checked it out to find out if there were
any building violations they wouldn't have been able to find
any because there weren't any red tags.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I ask you and
implore you don't turn away people like the Smiths from
justice.
This I consider to be an in]ust, an unjust
lawsuit.
It should not have been brought.
Please,
please validate them and their refusal to concede to any of
these unjust claims against them.
They are people of
integrity.
Please, do not disparage their integrity.
Because they are good people and they are deserving of a
verdict from you, a defense verdict. And that's what I ask
you to give them.
Thank you very much.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Dixon.
Mr. Hadley, you may make your final closing
argument
FINAL ARGUMENT BY MR. HADLEY
MR. HADLEY:
Yes, Your Honor.
Let's talk about the statute of limitations just
COURT PROCEEDINGS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

quickly.
The discovery doctrine applies to the defects for
the breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure claims.
I'm going to read this. Actually the Judge has (short
inaudible, away from mic) copies.
The discovery rule benefits a plaintiff by
operating to toll, stop or extend the time period, as it
were, of the statute of limitations until the discovery of
the defects of the home that form the basis for the cause of
action. A rigid application of the statute of limitations
may be irrational and unjust in some circumstances. That is
why the discovery rule is available.
Let's talk about the windows.
You have those
pictures.
Do you remember when Mike Barrett was on the
witness stand9 And I was, I was trying to get some
guidance. We got picture, I think it's #2-A and #2-B.
#2-A, wow, we've got damage. #2-B, I thought it looked
pretty bad.
But Mr. Barratt said no, I don't think that's
damage. Give me a line, give me a line between #2-A and
#2-B, where do you say there's damage.
He couldn't do it.
You're going to have to be asked to do that.
You're going
to have to be asked to do that.
Those pictures were taken
about 2003 was the evidence that came in.
Mary Moore discovered that she had a foundation
footing problem when fence hole posts were dug in order to
put in a gate on the east side of her house.
That's when it
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was discovered in 2000.
Would the discovery rules say that
well, that's probably pretty reasonable, she didn't have to
be out there digging around her footings to find out she had
a problem.
And quite frankly, would she have even known?
I mean, Mary Moore knows nothing about construction.
There
is the construction knowledge over there.
As-is, as-is, that is a doctrine.
Fraudulent
nondisclosure and breach of contract are exceptions to the
as-is clause that's found in this agreement.
They're
exceptions to it.
The as-is clause does not prevent
Mrs. Moore from filing suit or recovering damages on defects
that breach the contract.
You're going to read that one,
and I've read it to you.
Or were fraudulently concealed.
I mean, why would we even be here? If the as-is
clause was an up front defense why are we chatting today?
And why are you folks missing out on other things in life?
It's because it's a defense.
That's, that's why we're
here.
Notice. For a breach of contract claim
plaintiff asserts that defendant had
notice of the footing defect in the
home.
I don't know how that could be more plain, quite
frankly. They knew, they absolutely knew.
Notice isn't red
tag, by the way. Notice is just you have knowledge.
The
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defense is trying to say well, if Jack would have red tagged
it then they would have had notice.
That's not what the
code says and that's not what the law says. And the fact is
Jack told them at least twice we've got a problem with the
foundation footings.
An inspection. Would the reasonable person
purchasing a home from a licensed general contractor who had
built hundreds of homes in Salt Lake City go out two weeks
after .a certificate of occupancy has been issued and hire
someone to do an inspection?
But they say we have that
duty.
The law in Utah imputes a high degree of
specialized knowledge and expertise with regard to
residential construction to contractors.
The defendant is
held to possess the knowledge of a reasonable prudent
contractor under similar circumstances.
You know, how convenient, how absolutely convenient
that the core defense to this litigation, the core defense is
well, Bill's dead, Bill's dead, he's gone, and it just so
happens that during that nub of conversation Mary wasn't
present.
You think about that.
Thank you.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Hadley.
Okay.
Members of the jury, now is the time that
we encourage you to discuss the case among yourselves.
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THE JUDGE:
Let me just ask you this question.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Yes, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:
There's two different kinds of
discovery rules, there's the statutory discovery rule,
there's the equitable discovery rule.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
That is correct.
THE JUDGE:
And your, is it your position that the
equitable discovery rule doesn't app] y to thi s particular
section?
MR. HEIDEMAN:
In this particular instance,
Your Honor, it does not apply to (3)(a), specifically the
contract actions as I've argued with regard to the statute of
repose.
Equitable causes or discovery occur at the point :i i .
time when there is a reason why an injury would not be
discovered.
For instance, if a, well, let's use the typical
medical malpractice.
If sponge or a scalpel were left inside
of a patient it's unlikely they would notice that for some
period of time, a scalpel might be a little more noticeable

20

than a sponge but still there would be a time lag.
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THE JUDGE:
But you understand in the jury
instructions in this case the court, you know, instructed tl ie
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jury concerning, you know, that they, that it would only be

24
25

tolled if a reasonable person would not have, would have not
discovered it, and they found that a reasonable person would
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not 1 iave discovered it.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
But
I believe that there is a difference in what was being asked
of the jury and what is being asked of the court today.
What was being asked of the jury is a reasonable man's
standard, something akin to negligence, a finding of fact
that a jury would specifically make.
What I am requesting
the court consider today is whether or not the l a w —
THE JUDGE:
Which is the same point that's been
argued several times previously.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Your Honor, I would agree with
that with one small change. I do not, I did not in my
perusal of the prior docket find an argument with regard to
the statute of repose.
And the statute of repose when
coupled with this I think makes a substantial difference in
the interpretation simply because it does not mention
(3)(a).
If the statute of repose is to be believed then
there can be no extension beyond nine years. So why then
would it not say if a contract could be extended beyond-THE JUDGE:
This clearly was not brought, this was
brought within nine years.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
That's correct, Your Honor
Absolutely.
The statute of repose is not \ /hat I'm. arguing
is the bar.
THE Jlinr.K:
Okay.
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THE JUDGE:
Thank you.
Okay.
Let's take up the
plaintiff's request for award of attorney's fees and costs.
Who is going to speak to that? Mr. Dodd?
MOTION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
ARGUMENT BY MR. DODD
MR. DODD:
I will, Your Honor.
Your Honor, plaintiff has requested her attorney
fees, costs and expenses pursuant to paragraph N of the
earnest money sales agreement.
Paragraph N states in part
that
Both parties agree that should either
party default in any of the covenants or
agreements herein contained the
defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses including a reasonable
attorney's fee which may arise or accrue
from enforcing or terminating this
agreement, or in pursuing any remedy
provided hereunder or by applicable law
whether such remedy is pursued by filing
a suit or otherwise.
The defendants qualify as defaulting party pursuant
to this agreement.
The Utah Supreme Court in Foote v. Clark
held that a finding that a party has materially breached an
agreement is tantamount to holding that they defaulted in the
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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agreement.
The jury found that the defendants breached the
earnest money sales agreement.
Therefore, plaintiff is
entitled recover all of her fees pursuant to the earnest
money sales agreement.
THE JUDGE:
You had, this has gone on for five
years and you had a lengthy complaint. Most of all the
causes of action were dismissed except, the only one you can
recover attorney's fees under is the breach of contract one
provision of that, and you only, and the only portion of your
breach of contract cause of action that you recovered on was
the a, failure to disclose violations of the building code.
And you're asking this court to award reasonable attorney's
fees for that, where you're only, you were only successful in
that portion, for all of your attorney fees and costs?
MR. DODD:
Yes, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:
That's not going to happen.
MR. DODD:
Your Honor, we request that under two
theories.
First, we request it because the plaintiffs are
not required to categorize-THE JUDGE:
Yes, they are.
MR. DODD:
-- their claims as successful claims
or unsuccessful claims—
THE JUDGE:
Yes, they are.
MR. DODD:
—under the earnest money sales
agreement.
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the time we have cases on which there can only be recovery
for attorney's fees under one of the causes of action and,
and we require attorneys to differentiate what attorney's
fees were associated with that particular portion of which
they can recover and, and the court's only going to award
attorney fees for, for the work that they were successful and
had, the right and obligation to be awarded attorney's fees
for.
MR. DODII
I respectfully disagree.
In
Cottonwood Mall the Supreme Court specifically stated that a
party who requests an attorney's fees award has the burden of
presenting evidence sufficient to support the award, except
in the most simple cases the evidence should include hours
spent in the case, the hourly rates, the rates charged for
those hours and the usual customary rates for such work.
This i s the specific requirements under Rule 73.
THE JUDGE:
Those are the requirements for any
award of attorney's fees. But you have to have a basis for
the award of attorney's fees, and the only, the only basis
you have a right to recover attorney's fees is under the
earnest money agreement.
MR. DODD:
Well, in Foote V. Clark, a case that:
was cited by the defendants for their, for their own
propositions, Foote V. Clark the Supreme Court held that
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under a, they had an earnest money sales agreement almost
exactly the same as our paragraph N has for the attorney's
fees clause.
In Foote V. Clark the claim for the attorney's
fees the court stated that this contract, the earnest money
sales agreement, does not require any evaluation of the
parties respective success in an action brought to remedy a
default.
It says the reason why it doesn't require any
evaluation of the parties respective success is because
earnest, paragraph N does not require you to be successful in
your claims to recover, paragraph N only requires that there
be a defaulting party, and the defaulting party is therefore
required to pay all of the attorney's fees and costs in the
action. It says or any, or any remedy provided hereunder or
by applicable law.
Paragraph N as Foote V. Clark, the
Supreme Court, Supreme Court case of Utah specifically states
does not require an evaluation of the party's success in the
action
Furthermore, even if this court did decide that we
were, we were required to differentiate between the
successful claims and the nonsuccessful claims we would still
be able to recover under an alternate theory.
In Kurth V.
Wiarda the Appeals Court of Utah specifically held that where
the proof of a compensable claim and otherwise noncompensable
claim are so closing related and require proof of the same
facts, a successful party is entitled to recover it's fees
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Court held that a defendant who successfully defended against
a breach of contract claim in connection with costs and
attorney's fees incurred were recoverable, he was entitled to
recover costs relating to the factual development which while
necessary to defeat the contract claim also bore on the
negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims on which
the defendant prevailed, even though those costs incurred in
connection with those claims were not by themselves
recoverable.
So what these, what these cases hold is that where
the facts required to prove separate causes of, action
actions are so enter mingled and intertwined to be
indistinguishable then-THE JUDGE:
I would take it, I would agree with
you, you know, clearly you had a breach of contract claim and
a, and a fraudulent nondisclosure claim that were identical
as to the, as to the building code violation with respect to
the frost line.
MR. DODD:
Uh-huh (affirmative).
THE JUDGE:
And, you know, no question on that.
But you had 40, listed 40 other alleged defects and when we
came down to trial only, only one, you only prevailed on one.
MR. DODD:
Your Honor, as you can recall though
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the defense is not the present defense that, you know, that
was previously.
They brought up numerous times of all those
41 defects how small, how minor, how minute they were, this,
this laundry list of defects the defendants have. Clearly
throughout the entire time of the trial the major defects
that, the major defects in the home were the ones we went to
trial on, those are the ones the time were spent on, those
are the time that the experts spent their time on, those were
the defects to-THE JUDGE:
Only, only on about the last six
months of this five, five year odyssey.
MR. DODD:
To be able to try to differentiate the
time spent on the footings, on the footings defect and the
time spent, the research is all the same.
Whether or not
there's a... You don't have defects on whether or not, you
don't have research to go and find whether or not a defect
that's a footing defect that's latent is different than a
defect that's a window defect that's latent, or a defect
that's a stair rise defect that's latent.
But all of the
research, all of the memorandums written, all of the
depositions, everything would have been taken place the exact
same —
THE JUDGE:
So if y o u —
MR. DODD:
— besides maybe a few, a few of the
motion that's were filed.
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MR. DODD:
W e l l , Your H o n o r , since the Utah
Supreme Court specifically h a s held o n n u m e r o u s occasions
that the amount of damages awarded h a s n o b e a r i n g whatsoever
on attorney's fees-THE JUDGE:
No.
Ti ley, t h e y ' v e awarded just the
opposite.
MR. DODD:
What's that, Y o u r Honor?
T H E JUDGE:
The amount, t h e a m o u n t in dispute is
one of the factors that the court c a n look to to determine
what the reasonableness of attorney's fees i s .
MR. DODD:
W e l l , Your H o n o r , riant h ^ n
KcuLe
V. Clark,
Utal i \ las consistently h e l d . . .
This is from Foote V. Clark.
... consistently held that t h e amount of
attorney's fees awarded in a c a s e cannot
be said to be unreasonable just because
it is greater than the amount of judgment
attained.
THE JUDGE:
Well—
MR. DODD:
So of course y o u asked, y o u asked m e
t h e question do I feel i t ' s reasonable t o have an award of i n
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excess
of $100,000 of attorney's fees on a case that was
$30,000 judgment.
Y e s , I think i t ' s r e a s o n a b l e .
First of
a l l , this case has gone on for five y e a r s not b e c a u s e it
couldn't have happened very soon or n o t b e c a u s e . . .
There's
been 25 m o t i o n s that the p l a i n t i f f s h a v e h a d to defend
against in this case.
The three m o t i o n s that w e ' r e here
today are frivolous, Your Honor, we s h o u l d n ' t b e here
s p e a k i n g about these m o t i o n s besides t h e a t t o r n e y ' s fees.
T h e r e a s o n w h y there's over $100,000 in a t t o r n e y ' s fees is
b e c a u s e t h e defense h a s tried to d r o w n M a r y M o o r e in h e r
a t t o r n e y ' s fees and keep h e r from l i t i g a t i n g this case.
That i s their specific i n t e n t .
T H E JUDGE:
W e l l they wer<
t
frivolous if the court granted them,.
M R . DODD:
That w a s their s p e c i f i c i n t e n t .
And
n o , they weren't granted, only t h e last five were granted.
Utah h a s hinted in V a l c a r c e v e r s u s Fitzgerald that
a d e f e n d a n t might b e estopped from a r g u i n g e x c e s s i v e
a t t o r n e y ' s fees when the p l a i n t i f f ' s fees were increased m a n y
times over what they should have b e e n b y the litigation
tactics employed b y t h e d e f e n d a n t s .
P l a i n t i f f ' s large
a t t o r n e y fees are a reflection of t h e tactics that the
defendants have employed in trying to run up Ms. Moore's
expenses.
To now try to reduce h e r e x p e n s e s to a m i n i m u m
w o u l d b e unjust to her b e c a u s e of t h e tactics that the, that
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exorbitant or in excess because of their own tactics would be
unjust. I think in light of this it would be, if they claim
our attorney's fees are exorbitant or, or too much I think it
would be very educational to know what the defense attorney's
fees has been during the prosecution of this matter and the
defense of this matter, specifically since the defense on the
first day of trial revealed to the plaintiffs that theirs has
also been well in excess of $100,000 and that was before
trial.
So to now ask me whether or not these, these
attorney's fees are reasonable, yes, they're reasonable.
They're reasonable because Mary Moore has had to, has had to
go through five years of litigation, motion after motion
after motion, two motions after the judgment has already been
given. The judgment nov and the 60(b) motion, both of those
have been heard and, and decided by this court.
Why, why
force Mary Moore to spend thousands of more dollars to come
down here today to relitigate issues that have already been
decided.
That's been the tactics of the defense the entire
time.
So yes, they are reasonable.
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And third, the defense, the plaintiffs claim costs
and expenses under paragraph N.
This is not a Rule 54(d)
cost and expense as the defense is trying to lead you to
believe.
Costs, taxable costs as under Rule 54(d), yes,
they are restricted to specific criteria that has been
enumerated by the court on numerous occasions.
The courts
have interpreted what a cost is on a Rule 54(d) numerous
times and many of the costs that the plaintiff is requesting
are not costs pursuant to Rule 54(d).
We are not
requesting costs pursuant to Rule 54(d).
We are requesting
costs pursuant to paragraph N of the earnest money sales
agreement.
Paragraph N specifically states all costs and
expenses, not just costs, all costs and expenses will be
awarded.
That has been interpreted by, by the Utah Supreme
Court in Chase V. Scott.
The Utah Supreme Court has said
that costs recoverable pursuant to Rule 54(d), sorry.
Where a contract exists that provides
for award of costs the contract should be
interpreted to include those costs that
were associated with the litigation but
would not be included in costs awarded
pursuant to interpretation of the
Rule 54(d) in order to not render the
contract provisions superfluous.
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meaningless?
Because all costs are, are awarded to the
prevailing party pursuant to Rule 54(d).
It doesn't matter
if you have a contract or not.
No contract, you get the
costs.
But where you have a contract that says you get the
costs, the costs, the definition of costs then expands, it
expands to include more costs that aren't included under
pursuant to Rule 54(d).
So not only does our contract
provide for costs, it also provides for expenses.
The term costs under the contract has been, has
been interpreted in Kraatz V. Heritage Imports that any, any
litigation expense can be recovered so long as they are
reasonable.
So if defense went to Hawaii to depose Mary
Moore that might not be a recoverable cost, it's not
reasonable, but —
THE JUDGE:
But you've got $34,000 in costs,
Mr. Dodd .
MR. DODD:
And we have analyzed each and every
one.
The defense has had opportunity to look at each and
every one, and the only ones that they have pointed out that
they object to is they have pointed out to the telephone, the
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long distance telephone charges, they pointed out to the
copies, the postage stamps and the expert witnesses.
Those
are the only ones that they specifically enumerated.
They
did not specifically enumerate any other costs they opposed
to-THE J U D G K
I Jell, your expert witnesses come to
about $20,000.
MR. DODD:
Exactly.
And Your Honor, in Kraatz V.
Heritage Imports this case was specifically regarding expert
witnesses costs under, under a attorney's fees clause that
was almost identical to the attorney's fees clause in our
paragraph N.
THE JUDGE:
You think it's reasonable to pay, to
pay an expert $20,000 when the only possible recovery was
between 30 and $40,000?
MR. DODD:
Well, Your Honor, pursuant to Kraatz V.
Heri tage Imports yes, it is reasonable.
THE JUDGE:
I don't think so.
It's not
reasonable.
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MR. DODD:

Y o u r H o n o r , t h o s e e x p e r t witi lesses

fees

were, were incurred at the, at the time to, to create, to
create the facts and the causes of actions in the case, to be
able to have many of the-THE JUDGE:
You've got to, you've got to use some
c.nmnii in s prise, Mr. Dodd.
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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MR. DODD:
Well, Your Honor, to be frank the only
reasoi i we recovered $30,000 is because all of our causes of
action and defects were in fact dismissed by you on an
incorrect ruling about the latent and patent defects.
If
this was to go up on Supreme Court to determine whether or
not those defect were latent or patent 95% of every one of
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those defect would be determined they were in fact latent and
this judgment would be for the entire price for the home.
The Supreme Court has specifically stated many
times that —
THE JUDGE:
Well you should, you know, you have
your option to choose remedies. If you would have chosen a
remedy of rescission I'm sure that Mr. Smith would have
bought back the house for $85,000.
MR. DODD:
Well, Your Honor, the plaintiffs, the
defense has never once been willing to do anything whatsoever
to try to settle or resolve this issue.
They've-MR. HEIDEMAN:
Your Honor, I'm going to object.
I think that counsel is speaking toward settlement
negotiations and his-THE JUDGE:
Let's just, let's get back to the fees
and costs.
MR. DODD:
Okay, Your Honor.
The, in Chase V.
Scott the court specifically held that photocopying expenses
and deposition costs are awardable under a contract—
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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THE JUDGE:
I have no problem with those.
MR. DODD:
— that provides for costs.
In Kraatz V. Heritage Imports the court
specifically held that expert witnesses costs are, are
awardable.
THE JUDGE:
Reasonable expert witness costs.
MR. DODD:
Yes. All of it is done by a, it has to
be done by a reasonable standard. If not a reasonable
standard then anything would go. And there was, I can't
remember what case it was, I think it was Kraatz where they
said if it wasn't a reasonable, if it wasn't a reasonable
standard it would be absurd.
So of course, it's pursuant to
a reasonable standard.
If I, I, if we want to go through
and determine the reasonableness of each and every one of
those costs the plaintiff would be very very willing to do
so. They, there's not been a single cost that's been charged
that has not been a reasonable cost.
If... The reasonable standard of whether or not it
was reasonable is, it's a reasonable, it's reasonable in
pursuing the litigation in the matter.
It does not
determine whether or not the... In Kraatz the expert
witnesses, Your Honor, never testified at trial, they never
even stepped on the stand and the court still held that those
fees can be reasonable.
Why?
Because when they were
incurred, when the, when the party incurred those expenses of
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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an expert witness they were doing it in depositions, they
were doing it in pursuing their case, they were doing it in
litigation.
It was not an unreasonable cost at the time
even though it never brought fruit, even though it never
actually, the experts testified.
Kraatz Utah Supreme Court
specifically held that those can be reasonable charges.
In this case the defendants had expert witnesses,
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defendants had expert charges. I would, I would love to see
what their, their charges have been for their expert
witnesses. If our charges aren't reasonable why would the
defense go through the same exact process of expending that
amount of money to have expert witnesses as well.
Of course
it was reasonable.
It was reasonable because it was the
only way that this woman would have got a $30,000 judgment.
Without the expert witnesses none of the judgment would even
have been given.
And that's the same reason that the
defense went through the process of their expert witnesses
and the same reason they went through having the costs of
theirs. I think it would be very educational to know what
their expenses have been because our expenses would be deemed
very reasonable pursuant to theirs.
This case has endured for almost five years.
The
plaintiff finally had an opportunity to have this case
presented to a peer of jury, to a jury of her peers to hear
and decide this case.
The jury found that the defendants
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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breached the earnest money sales agreement, therefore,
they're the defaulting party.
They found that they
committed fraudulent nondisclosure in not disclosing the
defects m the home. Plaintiff is entitled all of her
attorney's fees.
Even the attorney's fees that, even the
attorney's fees that have been incurred after the final
judgment m pursuing this matter.
Thus... The plaintiffs
request that all of the attorney's fees that, that Mary Moore
has requested including the attorney's fees for preparing for
these motions here today which amount to $4,907 since
March 10th and attorney's fees, and $156.55 m costs m
recording, m recording fees.
We ask that that be augmented
to the original amounts requested in the motion and we
request that all of the attorney's fees be awarded to the
plaintiff pursuant to the contract.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:
Let me just aok you one question,
Mr. Dodd, just reviewing. You have, m your detailed billmq
you have carryovers of costs, you know, bounced forward
1
haven't gone to taking the time to add them all up but it
would appear to me that the balance forwards have been added
twice.
And then you have these fees do project analysis
that were paid directly by Mrs. Moore, 5,852 and then, for
periods back m 2001, 2002.
And then you have project
analysis, you know, separate billings.
COURT PROCEEDINGS

1
7
3
1

Are they, are they all, have you, has your office
reviewed to make ^ure that the balance forwards aren't being
added twice 9
MR. HADLE1:
Can I respond to that?
THE JUDGE:
Go ahead, Mr. Hadley.
MR. HADLEY:
I was involved, Mr. Dodd was not.
The $5,820, that was paid directly by Mary Moore to
two project analysts and was never entered on our bill
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because heretofore we had, you know, we'd pay it and then
we'd bill her so we would have a record of it in our billing
system.
So the reason the 5,820 is an add-on is it's not m
our, it's not in our system. 5,787 is what she shows here.
So that's-THE JUDGE:
Okay. So they got, they got over 13,
$14,000?
MR. HADLEY:
Including trial.
That's correct.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
MR. DODD:
And, Your Honor, I appreciate that you
bring up a few of those specific a, fees that you were
concerned about.
I would just like to point out the defense
has not pointed to one single fee that they dispute, not
one.
And in light of that, Your Honor, the, the
plaintiff's request all their fees and costs and expenses
be awarded in this matter pursuant to the, to the attorney's
fees clause.
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THE JUDGE:
Okay.
Thank you.
Mr. Heideman?
MR. HEIDEMAN:
May I approach, Your Honor?
THE JUDGE:
You may
ARGUMENT BY MR. HEIDEMAN
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Thank you, sir.
My wife tells me
I like to draw because it means my fingers get to breathe.
Let's start with just a moment with the language
from the case that I just passed to the court.
This is the
Foote case, Your Honor.
The language of the contract does not
permit assessing fees against the Clarks
that relate to the noncontract claims
against either Hatch or the brokers.
You can read the rest of the paragraph but it's
very clear from the court's comments that there is a
substantial disagreement between plaintiff's counsel and the
law.
The law is very clear that if you have a contract you
can recover your fees on the contract.
That does not give
you the ability to recover your fees on a tort.
And in this
particular instance that's what they're seeking.
To begin with, Your Honor, I would like to simply
say this.
There are multiple factors involved in looking at
what is a reasonable attorney's fee.
There's a list of
them, they comprise approximately six elements. Those
elements deal with the difficulty of litigation, the
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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efficiency of an attorney in presenting the case,
reasonableness of hours spent, fees customarily charged in
the area and by the types of attorneys involved, an amount in
controversy, and a result attained and the expertise required
to try the matter.
This case is the model of what should never happen
in litigation.
If counsel's representation is accurate they
spent $120,645 and change.
And if his assumption is even
remotely correct that the defense spent that same amount of
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money we have spent nearly $300,000 on a case that's worth 30
grand.
That's ridiculous.
If our job as attorneys is to
resolve cases beneficially for our clients everyone in this
litigation has failed.
Now having said that, paragraph N is an
interesting paragraph because it deals with defaulting
parties.
It doesn't say prevailing, it says defaulting.
And there's a substantial difference there because prevailing
means you win, default means you defaulted on a contract.
So as a result we're automatically reduced to one cause of
action.
I'd like to present the court with some math.
As
I reviewed this case there was approximately 42 defects and
there was six causes of action, or as my old torts professor
used to call substantive causes of action, which I equate to
approximately 48 issues.
Now, we just heard counsel admit
COURT PROCEEDINGS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

that of these 48 approximately five were actually issues and
everything else was just thrown out.
That's a little
surprising and frankly a little concerning.
But be that as
it may if we have $120,000, let me get to my math so I get it
right, 120,645.88 that's asserted as the actual fee and we
break that down and do the math, 48 divided into 120 comes
out to be $2,513.45 per cause of action.
Your Honor, I
would suggest that that's fair. And what we'd like to have
the court do is award approximately $5,000 attorney's fees to
opposing counsel and then we'll put that as the credit
against the other 40 that we had to defend that they either
dismissed, dropped or threw out the window.
It seems a little bit ridiculous that what they're
trying to do is augment by 621% their judgment.
THE JUDGE:
Well, you'd have to agree though,
Mr. Heideman, that there is some duplication of efforts with
respect-MR. HEIDEMAN:
Sure.
THE JUDGE:
—
to the, to the causes of action
that, that are recoverable, their attorney's fees a n d —
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Yes.
THE JUDGE:
And clearly it took them, just look at
the trial, it took them the three days of the trial to
recover that, you know, for the one contract claim.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
That's correct.
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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THE JUDGE:
And, you know, maybe even if we broke
down the trial time and divided by the two, because they
were successful on the one tort claim or one, one contract
claim, you know, it's going to be more than what you're
asking but-MR. HEIDEMAN:
Well, that's correct.
Except for
the fact that they wouldn't be entitled to the tort claim,
they'd be entitled to the one.
THE JUDGE:
Well, I know that.
That's what I
said t h a t —
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MR. HEIDEMAN:
That's right.
THE JUDGE:
And even if you divided the attorney's
fees portion of the trial in half it would b e —
MR. HEIDEMAN:
No, I agree. I agree entirely,
Your Honor.
And I think that counsel for the plaintiffs
would also have to admit that to beat 46 causes of action
also required something.
In other words, and particularly
when we've just had an admission that only the big ones were
what were tried so that means only two out of the 48 that
were raised. And there's an allegation that the defense is
somehow trying to break the bank of the plaintiff.
That's
troubling.
Your Honor, fees in Utah under the Tuttle case, or
Turtle Management case are only allowed when there's a
specific statute or a specific contract term.
And in this
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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particular case there's a contract term.
And we agree with
that.
But before this court can even determine whether or
not attorney's fees are appropriate this court is going to
have to determine whether or not plaintiffs win, because
we've already presented this court with a very specific
reason why under 60(b) this court should reverse the
ruling.
But the thing that's more concerning, the thing
that I think is important for this court to understand is
that in order for them to be able to claim the fee that they
have sought they have to have delineated the fee in three
ways, they have to have shown exactly which fees correlate
with the items that they were successful on oh, they have to
show exactly which items correlate with the items they were
not successful on, and they have to show exactly which items
correlate with the items they could not have been successful
on.
That's been, they have failed to do that.
And at the
point in time that they failed to do that case law allows you
to completely eliminate their attorney's will fees.
You
have that jurisdiction and that discretion.
THE JUDGE:
I'm only going to do that if I rule in
your favor on the other one.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Fair enough.
THE JUDGE:
They're going to, they're going to get
their attorney's fees.
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MR. HEIDEMAN:
Fair enough.
THE JUDGE:
The reasonable attorney's fees on the
contract claim.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
And so I guess the question then
becomes how do we determine what's reasonable and at that
point, Your Honor, I guess it comes down to one thing.
We
had hoped to spare the court the, the necessary hassle but we
would simply make a motion to the court for an evidentiary
hearing to try each one if that's what needs to be done
because they have filed to outline it. We'll make that
motion, we're entitled to it under the rule, and we'll simply
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have the hearing and we'll, well put them on and we'll go
through each one of those items unless we can come to some
type of agreement as to what is reasonable.
But quite frankly, given the level of fee that
they're requesting and the level of fee that we think they
ought to get I would be surprised if they would be willing to
do that.
So absent, absent some stipulation that's what our
request would. Be, and I guess I need not go further because
we'll make the rest of our argument at the hearing.
Unless
the court would prefer me to g o —
THE JUDGE:
Anything else?
MR. HEIDEMAN:
I'm sorry?
THE JUDGE:
Anything else then?
MR. HEIDEMAN:
If the court would prefer I can.
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THE JUDGE:
Well —
MR. HEIDEMAN:
If the court —
THE JUDGE:
What my, what I'm going to do is I'm
going to request that the plaintiffs review their billings
and that they with the, with the indication that the court
is only going to award attorney's fees for the contract
portion of, of the litigation and a, and to review their
attorney's fees and a, indicate which portions of those
attorney's fees were necessary, were required to pursue the
contract portion, the contract portion that was successful.
Clearly, you know, clearly when they, when one of, I can't
remember if, if they alleged more than one violation of the
building code.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
42 to be specific.
THE JUDGE:
Well, I mean that, that, it's
pursuant to the contract the earnest money agreement the only
ones that they're recoverable on under the contract would be
those that, that Mr. Smith was aware of and, you know, the
evidence that came out at trial was was that, at least the
jury believed that he was aware of this a, grading issue.
And-MR. HEIDEMAN:
With respect, Your Honor, I would
suggest also perhaps that the court take a look at one final
thing and that's that of the six causes of action the breach
of contract was modified on September 29th, 2003, so anything
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prior to that would be inapplicable because of the
modification.
The fraudulent—
THE JUDGE:
Well not, not necessarily.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Okay.
THE JUDGE:
They had, they had a breach of
contract claim in their original complaint, didn't they?
MR. HEIDEMAN:
That's correct.
But it was
modified. I'm not saying it was dismissed, it was modified.
So the causes of action aside from those that survived would
be wiped out.
Maybe I didn't say that clearly enough.
I would also suggest that there would have to be a
serious and very hard look made with regard to fraudulent, or
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negligent misrepresentation which was dismissed on
August 16th, 2001, fraudulent misrepresentation dismissed
August 26th, 2004, violation of the Consumer Protection Act
was dismissed that same day.
THE JUDGE:
Well Ifm not awarding, I'm not
awarding attorney's fees for any of those.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
I'm just saying that we would want
to make sure that it is noted in their delineation that those
items were spelled out so that when they were dismissed we
can see how this pares itself down because those items they
would not be entitled to. And clearly they're asking for it
even though it was dismissed before the trial.
That's why
we would fall underneath, we believe under Stevenett versus
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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Wal-Mart. This is simply not reasonable. It's not right to
ask for all of your attorney's fees when at the end of the
day you come down with two, and hopefully we believe strongly
that at the end of the day you'll come down with none.
And so as a result, Your Honor, we would simply
request that we have an opportunity to review that and then
we can determine whether or not we can stipulate.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
Thank you.
Mr. Dodd?
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. DODD
MR. DODD:
Your Honor, the defendants, the
plaintiff should not be restricted to their fees solely for
the contract claim because the, the earnest money sales
agreement specifically states that all reasonable attorney's
fees—
THE JUDGE:
Well—
MR. DODD:
It says all reasonable—
THE JUDGE:
I DON'T want you to argue any more
because I've already made up my mind on that, Mr. Dodd.
You're not going to recover your attorney's fees for your
tort claims.
There's no way this court is, you know, if
you'd, if you'd been successful under the Consumer Sales
Practices Act and it permits attorney's fees then yes under
that, you know. But you can only recover if you have a
contractual right to do so or if you have a statutory right
to do so.
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MR. HEIDEMAN:
Uh-huh (affirmative).
THE JUDGE:
And—
MR. DODD:
And we have a contractual right,
Your Honor.
Contractual right is the contract states that
we can recover our fees for any remedy hereunder or
applicable law. A remedy of fraudulent nondisclosure is
applicable under law.
THE JUDGE:
Well, don't argue any more. I'm not
going to, I'm not going to permit you to recover it.
MR. DODD:
Furthermore, there's case law that
states that fees for, for fraud can be recovered under
contract. And if, and apparently you've decided. But
Your Honor, we would be more than willing to go through each
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and every single fee and demonstrate the reasonableness on
each one.
And furthermore, Your Honor, if we're going to be
required to do so, if you're going to determine our
reasonableness of our fees we think it would be very
beneficial if you were able to determine our reasonableness
of the fees based on the same fees as the opposing party in
the same litigation.
THE JUDGE:
Well, they're not asking to recover
theirs.
MR. DODD:
Yes, Your Honor. But to be able to
determine reasonableness of fees it would be beneficial to
you to determine whether or not the fees were reasonable or
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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not.
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THE JUDGE:
Well, there's no question in my mind
that, that Mrs. Moore has expended attorney's fees for these
other things and, but that's between her and her attorney
whether they're reasonable or not.
It's my obligation to
determine if I'm going to award attorney's fees the
reasonableness of requiring someone else to pay those
attorney's fees. And you only have the right to recover
attorney's fees if you have a contractual right to do so.
And, you know, it's unreasonable for this court to award
$120,000 ±n attorney's fees for recovery under one item of
contractual breach.
MR. DODD:
Well, Your Honor, I've gone through
numerous numerous Supreme Court cases that have stated the
opposite, I've gone through numerous cases that-THE JUDGE:
Well, don't argue it any more.
MR. DODD:
Okay.
Well, we would request that
you do a, perform a findings of fact for, for the fees and
determine—
THE JUDGE:
Well, I'm asking you to review your
proposed billing and submit a new billing with those fees
associated with pursuing the breach of contract claim that
you were successful on.
MR. DODD:
Okay.
Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:
And, and then the court will determine
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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whether that is a reasonable fee.
MR. DODD:
And under that when you do that
determination we request that y o u —
THE JUDGE:
And also go review your costs to, to,
and identify which costs are associated with pursuing the
contract dispute.
MR. DODD:
With the costs?
THE JUDGE:
Yes.
You can only recover, you know,
if you were just going after Rule 54 costs then I could, you
know, that's easy enough, you know, that's filing fee,
deposition fees and those type of things, witness fees.
But
you're asking, you know, you're asking for a lot more than
that, as you pointed out in your memorandum.
MR. DODD:
Your Honor, when you make that
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determination we request that you have a findings of fact
regarding the fees with it.
THE JUDGE:
Well, you know, I'm asking you to do
that, then I'll make a determination as to what a reasonable
fee is.
MR. HADLEY:
We'll comply, Your Honor.
MR. DODD:
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:
Okay. The court will take that as
indicated, that matter under advisement, will rule on that
particular issue on the 60(b) issue and then we'll make a
ruling with respect to the reason, a reasonable attorney's
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM MOORE and
MARY MOORE,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiffs,

vs.

CASE NO. 000700142

DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust and
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,

DATE: July 27, 2005
JUDGE: Hon. Donald J. Eyre
TYG

Defendant

The above entitled matter came before the Court upon the Plaintiffs Motion for an
Order Awarding Attorney's fees and costs. The Court has now reviewed all the pleadings filed
both in support and in opposition to plaintiffs motion for the award of her attorney's fees and
costs. The Court now makes the following findings:
1. This case was tried to a jury over three days, March 7-9, 2005
2. By the time of trial either the Court or the Plaintiff had dismissed all their claims except their
two claims for fraudulent non-disclosure regarding the improper grading and the alleged
improper installation of windows and Plaintiffs breach of contract claim with respect to the
violation of the building code for improper grading.
3. At the conclusion of trial, the jury was asked to respond to special verdict questions. The jury
found there was a breach of contract for the violation of the building code as to grading. The jury
further found fraudulent non-disclosure with icspect to the improper grading, but not for the
installation of the windows. The jury awarded $30,680 00 \n monetary damages for the improper
grading.
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4. The only basis for the plaintiffs claim for recovery of her attorney's fees is paragraph N of
the Ernest Money Sales Agreement (which is the contract upon which the breach of contract
claim is based). It states in part as follows: "Both parties agree that should either party default in
any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses including a reasonable attorney's fees, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or
terminating this agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law,
whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise/"
5. The Plaintiff on or about April 4, 2005 filed a verified Motion for Attorney's Fees and costs
asking for $120, 645.88 in attorney fees and costs of $35,131.53 for a total request of
$155,777.41.
6. The Defendants filed objections to the requested attorneys fees and costs, in part alleging the
Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover attorney's fees for pursuing causes of actions other than
the breach of contract claim. The Defendants noted that the Plaintiffs had alleged six separate
causes of action in their Complaint and Amended Complaint, and that they were only entitled to
recover attorney's fees under the breach of contract cause of action. The Defendant further noted
that the Plaintiffs claims were based upon forty two alleged defects in Plaintiffs home, and that
the Plaintiffs ultimately only recovered under one of the defects.
7. On June 6, 2005 the Court held a hearing upon the Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney's Fees and
Costs. At the hearing the Court ruled that the Plaintiff was only entitled to recover that portion
of its attorney's fees associated with pursuing their successful breach of contract claim, and
directed the Plaintiff to review its detailed request for attorney's fees and costs and resubmit the
attorney's fees and costs that were accrued only in pursuing the successful breach of contract
claim.
8. The Plaintiff on June 20, 2005 filed its Response to Court's Directive Regarding Attorney's
Fees, Costs and Expenses, wherein the Plaintiff made only minor modifications to the prior
request. In the Court's opinion Plaintiffs attorney made no real effort to comply with the Courts
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directive to submit a claim for attorney's fees and costs associated with the successful breach of
contract claim. In fact the new submission totals $158,927.72 given the fact the Plaintiff is now
requesting an additional $6,717.00 in new attorney's fees since the last motion, and only reduced
the requested attorney's fees $3,822.24 pursuant to the Court's directive.
Since the Plaintiff has failed to provide any factual basis upon which the Court can
determine the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs claim for attorney's fees and costs the Court will
have to make its own evaluation of the request based upon its knowledge of the case and
evaluation of the claimed fees and costs and the Court's experience and knowledge of attorney's
fees in similar cases.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985
(Utah 1988) set forth the factors the trial court should consider in determining a reasonable
attorneys fee. They are as follows: "1. What legal work was actually performed? 2, How much
of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter? 3. Is the
attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar
services? 4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors ,
including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?" The Utah Supreme Court
also noted in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken that what an attorney bills or the number of hours
spent on the case is not determinative, citing Cabrera v. Cothell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1983). The
Court also noted that the amount in controversy was a factor but not a determinative factor.
In reviewing that Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees against these factors, the Court
first notes that there has not been any objection to the billing rate used by the Plaintiff and the
Court finds that it is consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar
services. The task before the Court is what legal work was actually performed in pursuing the
breach of contract claim for improper grading, and if all the legal work performed in that area
was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, and if there are other factors the
Court should consider in determining the reasonableness of the requested fees.
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The Couit realizes that it is difficult to diffeientiate between what legal services were
necessaiy foi the prosecution of the subject bieach of contiact claim and the Plaintiffs other
causes of action The Couit does know from his involvement with the case, that a substantial
portion of the motions in the case especially the various motions for summary judgment involved
causes of action other than the bieach of contiact cause of action It is the Court's perception
also that a substantial portion of the discovery in the case involves defects other than the
improper grading and involved information dealing with the othei causes of action
With respect to the issue whether the woik perfoimed was reasonably necessary to
adequately prosecute the matter, it is the Couif s observation that there were attorney's fees
generated by both sides that were not reasonable 01 necessaiy There were substantial
unnecessary attorney's fees generated in Motions to Reconsider and in disputes over the language
in proposed ordeis and unnecessary discovery disputes
Other circumstances the Court may considei with respect to the reasonableness of the
requested fee is that the $120,000 plus lequested attorney's fee is more than four times the
monetary award given the Plaintiff by the jury and is substantially more than the $83,000 00 total
purchase price for the subject house Although these factors should not be determinative of its
leasonableness of the subject fee, the Court does believe they are factors it should review in
determining the reasonableness of the fee
In reviewing the itemized claim for costs in the total amount of $35,131 53, the Court
notes that many of the items listed aie not the types of costs that are usually lecoverable by the
prevailing party pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Recoverable costs are
usually associated with things such as filing fees, witness fees, deposition expense, if the
depositions aie used at the time of trial, and similai type fees The Plaintiff has listed in addition
to the traditionally recoverable costs, things such as phone expense, copy expense, expert witness
fee, hotel and tiavel expense The Plaintiff states that it has the light to recover such costs and
expenses from the language of the subject contract where it states '

the defaulting party shall

pay all costs
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and expenses ...which may arise or accrue from enforcing ...this agreement...". A substantial
portion of Plaintiff s requested costs are associated with expert witness fees and reports. There
was no attempt by Plaintiff to allocate which costs , especially the expert witness fees, that
should be attributed to the breach of contract claims for which recovery was awarded by the jury.
The Plaintiff is entitled to recover those normal costs awarded to a prevailing party pursuant to
Rule 54 and any other costs or expenses associated with the breach of contract claim
Given the fact the Plaintiff failed to respond to the Court directive to recalculate her
attorney's fees and costs to those associated with the breach of contract claim only and for the
reasons stated above, the Court finds that it is reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded an
attorney's fee in the amount of $40,00.00 and costs in the amount of $10,000.00. The Judgment
previously entered in this case in the amount of $30,680.00 should be augmented in the amount
of $50,000.00 for a total Judgment in the amount of $80,680.00.
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